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THE STRUCTURE OF A GENERAL
THEORY OF NONDISCLOSURE
Christopher T Wonnell*
Nondisclosure cases have often turned on two factual distinc-
tions: the distinction between nondisclosure by a buyer and a
seller and between nondisclosure of intrinsic and extrinsic facts.
The author critically examines these distinctions in order to de-
rive a general framework for the resolution of nondisclosure
cases. The author then applies his nondisclosure framework to
the problem of foreseeability in contract damages and, more
generally, to other default rules.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE OPEN-ENDED LAW OF NONDISCLOSURE
DIFFICULT PROBLEMS OF law and policy arise from a com-
mon factual phenomenon: a party to a contract who is in pos-
session of information pertinent to the contractual exchange elects
not to reveal that information to the other party Several legal
responses to such nondisclosure1 are possible: condemnation of
nondisclosure as tantamount to fraud, approval of nondisclosure as
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego. B.A., Northwestern University (1979);
J.D., University of Michigan (1982). 1 would like to thank Larry Alexander, Kevin Cole,
Gail Heriot, Paul Horton, Mike Kelly, Emily Sherwin, Steve Walt, and Bill Wang for their
helpful comments.
1. Nondisclosure is defined as "[a] failure to reveal facts, which may exist when
there is no 'concealment.'" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1053 (6th ed. 1990). Concealment
is "[a] withholding of something which one knows and which one, in duty, is bound to
reveal." Id. at 289.
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the just reward for entrepreneurial discovery of information, or
tolerance for nondisclosure as an inevitable by-product of a
human predisposition against affirmatively aiding others. Predict-
ably, perhaps, the legal response to nondisclosure has consisted of
a confused mixture of all three reactions.
There has been ample opportunity to develop a coherent re-
sponse to the phenomenon of nondisclosure, since it arises in a
wide range of settings. Nondisclosure is specifically treated in the
Restatements of Agency,2 Contracts,3 Restitution,4 Torts,5 and
Trusts.6 Under the label of insider trading, nondisclosure has been
a major preoccupation of statutes and regulations governing the
sale of securities.7 In addition, federal labor laws address the issue
of nondisclosure of material facts by the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement.8
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390 (1958) (An agent acting as an
adverse party with the principal's consent "has a duty to deal fairly with the principal and
to disclose to him all facts which the agent knows or should know would reasonably affect
the principal's judgment ").
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1979) (listing situations in
which nondisclosure is equivalent to an assertion).
4. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 8 (1936) (including in the definition of
fraud "non-disclosure, where it is not privileged, by any person intending or expecting
thereby to cause a mistake by another to exist or to continue, in order to induce the latter
to enter into or refrain from entering into a transaction").
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977) (The section entitled "Lia-
bility for Nondisclosure" defines nondisclosure as the failure to disclose "a fact that [one]
knows may justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transac-
tion [if one] is under a duty to the other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the
matter, in question.").
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959) (A trustee owes a duty to a
beneficiary "to communicate to him all material facts in connection with the transaction
which the trustee knows or should know.").
7. Many states require that owners of more than 10% of a domestic stock file with
the commissioner a statement that specifies their ownership interests; these individuals are
also required to update these statements as their interests change. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 21.40.010 (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-726-01 (1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 23-
69-122 (1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 5103 (1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-14-91
(1990); IOWA CODE § 523.7 (1989); see also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (concluding that "anyone in possession of material inside informa-
tion must either disclose it to the investing public, or must abstain from trading in or
recommending the securities concerned while such inside information remains undis-
closed."), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
8. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C § 158(a)(5) (1988) (holding it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with his employees'
representatives); Id. § 158(d) (requiring employer to bargain in good faith); see also, e.g.,
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 68 (3d Cir. 1965) ("[lf the requested data
is relevant and, [sic] therefore reasonably necessary, to a union's role as bargaining agent
in the administration of a collective bargaining agreement, it is an unfair labor practice
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A few specific prohibitions of nondisclosure have emerged
from this body of judicial decisions and legislative enactments.
Nondisclosure by a fiduciary is generally prohibited,9 although the
question of when fiduciary relationships exist remains troubling.10
In addition, a party who makes a disclosure is under an obligation
not to omit facts where such an omission would render the disclos-
ure misleading.11 Similarly, a party who chooses to speak regard-
ing a subject during negotiations may have an affirmative duty to
update statements which were true when originally made but
which have subsequently become false.1 2
Outside of these specific prohibitions, the law of nondisclo-
sure lapses into statements so vague that they can assume any
meaning. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts considers non-
disclosure tantamount to fraud when the nondisclosure "amounts
to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
standards of fair dealing."' 3 One commentator concluded that his
review of the "countless decisions" concerning vendor-purchaser
nondisclosure left only the question-begging theorem that
for an employer to refuse to furnish the requested data.").
9. See, e.g., Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1987)
("close corporations buying their own stock, like knowledgeable insiders of closely held
firms buying from outsiders, have a fiduciary duty to disclose material facts."), cert. dis-
missed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988).
10. See generally DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
1988 DUKE L.J. 879 ("Fiduciary obligation is one of the most elusive concepts in Anglo-
American law ").
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(b) (1977) (A party to a busi-
ness transaction must exercise reasonable care to disclose "matters known to him to be
necessary to prevent his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being misleading
"); 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5(b)(1990) (In interstate securities transactions, it is unlawful
"[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading ").
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(c) ("One party to a business
transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the other before the
transaction is consummated subsequently acquired information that he knows will
make untrue or misleading a previous representation that when made was true or believed
to be so ").
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(b) (1979). According to the
Restatement:
A person's non-disclosure of a fact known to him is equivalent to an assertion
that the fact does not exist in the following cases only: (b) where he knows
that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake of the other party as to a
basic assumption on which that party is making the contract and if non-disclos-
ure of the fact amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with
reasonable standards of fair dealing.
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"[s]ilence or nondisclosure does not constitute an actionable
wrong, unless the defendant is under a duty to speak and
disclose. 1 4
An examination of three cases provides an example of the
continuing difficulty in reconciling the case law in this area. In
Thacker v Tyree, 5 the court held that the seller of a house has a
duty to disclose to the buyer that the house had been built on
filled ground causing structural problems.1" In Holly Hill Lumber
Co. v McCoy,' 7 the court held that a buyer of land has no duty to
disclose to the seller the existence of a valuable lime deposit on
the land.18 In Laidlaw v Organ,'9 the Supreme Court of the
United States held that a purchaser of tobacco was under no duty
to disclose to the seller that a peace treaty had just been signed,
ending the war of 1812 and the naval blockade that had been
holding down the price of tobacco. 0
These cases suggest two distinctions that a general theory of
nondisclosure should explain. The first is the distinction between
buyer and seller nondisclosure, with the law being much stricter
with respect to sellers.2 The second is the.distinction between the
failure to disclose intrinsic facts pertaining to the commodity at
hand and the failure to disclose extrinsic facts pertaining to the
general environment affecting the economic value of that com-
modity Several commentators have noted a tendency for the law
to take a stricter position regarding the nondisclosure of intrinsic
facts.22
Professor Keeton has listed the following as factors that
courts consider in nondisclosure cases:
(1) The difference in the levels of the parties' sophistication re-
garding the subject matter of the contract;
14. Goldfarb, Fraud and Nondisclosure in the Vendor-Purchaser Relation, 8 W
REs. L. REV. 5, 7 (1956).
15. 297 S.E.2d 885 (W Va. 1982).
16. Id. at 886-88.
17. 201 S.C. 427, 23 S.E.2d 372 (1942).
18. Id. at 443, 23 S.E.2d at 379.
19. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
20. Id. at 195.
21. See, e.g., Zaschak v. Traverse Corp., 123 Mich. App. 126, 333 N.W.2d 191
(1983) (Michigan law places no duty upon a prospective purchaser to disclose facts or
possible opportunities within his or her knowledge that materially affect the value of the
property).
22. See, e.g., Lawson, The Ethics of Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y
727, 740 (1988) (citing numerous historical commentators who draw a distinction between
intrinsic and extrinsic facts).
332 [Vol. 41:329
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(2) The relationship between the parties;
(3) The manner in which the information is acquired. Information
may be acquired by chance, by effort, or by an illegal act;
(4) The nature of the undisclosed fact. In contracts of sale of real
property, if the vendor conceals an intrinsic defect not discovera-
ble by reasonable care, the court will be more prone to find a duty
to disclose than it would be to find a duty to disclose an extrinsic
fact;
(5) The contracting position of the parties relative to each other.
It is more likely that a seller will be required to disclose informa-
tion than a purchaser;
(6) The nature of the contract. All material facts generally must
be disclosed in releases and contracts of insurance;
(7) The importance of the nondisclosed fact to the parties;
(8) The active concealment of any material fact.23
The literature has not attempted to bring these factors to-
gether into a general theory of nondisclosure. Only with the help
of a general theory can these and other factors be assigned their
proper weight, allowing the court to decide cases where the indi-
vidual factors militate toward opposite conclusions. The purpose
of this article is to formulate the basic structure for such a general
theory
A few preliminary words about the methodology of such a
general inquiry are in order. In recent years, the literature on the
nondisclosure problem has been animated by a concern for eco-
nomic efficiency, or the maximization of societal wealth.24 This
article follows that tradition for two reasons. First, efficiency can
be a proxy for utility across a relatively broad range of legal is-
sues.25 Second, efficiency often yields results compatible with indi-
vidualist moral intuitions about behavior.2
Nevertheless, because efficiency is not an end in itself, it will
be necessary to reconsider the normative case for particular rules
23. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS. R. KEETON & D. OWEN. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS
§ 106 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing and summarizing factors set forth in Keeton, Fraud,
Concealment and Non-disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REv, 1 (1936)).
24. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 97-99 (3d. ed. 1986) (dis-
cussing societal concerns regarding disclosure in consumer cases and the economic implica-
tions of disclosure for monopolistic industries).
25. See Wonnell, The Abstract Character of Contract Law, 22 CONN. L. REv. 437,
461-62 (1990) (describing utilitarian linkage with economic "value").
26. See R. POSNER, supra note 24, at 238-39 ("[O]n balance it would seem that
adherence to generally accepted moral principles increases the wealth of society more than
it reduces it ").
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that are indicated by an efficiency calculus. Accordingly, when it
appears that the efficiency analysis strains either a conception of
social utility or notions of ethical behavior, the compatibility issue
will be readdressed in that context.
The efficiency analysis draws on previous developments in the
law in its justification for the general framework of nondisclosure.
This article argues that the law in the nondisclosure area makes
many economically justifiable distinctions. Indeed, the sharp di-
chotomy between positive and normative analysis of law is not
wholly appropriate. While the law as it has evolved must not be
viewed uncritically, there is reason to believe that, in certain
cases, the law embodies a degree of unarticulated normative wis-
dom.2 Accordingly, one can view the compatibility of the effi-
ciency analysis with the existing judicial wisdom as another,
highly fallible, test of the normative validity of its conclusions.
Section II begins with a discussion of the competing contract
principles of mutually beneficial trade and security of promissory
transactions. Section III explores and justifies the nondisclosure
distinction between buyer and seller. Section IV addresses the dis-
tinction between the nondisclosure of extrinsic and intrinsic infor-
mation. Section V identifies some implications of the nondisclo-
sure analysis for the issues of foreseeability in contract damages
and default rules more generally Section VI describes the struc-
ture of a general theory of nondisclosure and summarizes some
tentative rules of nondisclosure.
II. A PRELIMINARY ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE: MUTUALLY
BENEFICIAL TRADE VERSUS THE SECURITY OF PROMISSORY
TRANSACTIONS
In searching for a unifying principle in the nondisclosure
area, it is useful to return to basic principles of contract law Con-
tract law defines and nurtures two social institutions: promise and
exchange.29 Generally speaking, both are necessary for contrac-
tual obligations to arise. A promise without an exchange may be
27. See infra text accompanying notes 80-81, 155-57 & 163-66.
28. See Barnett, Foreword: Of Chickens and Eggs - The Compatibility of Moral
Rights and Consequentialist Analyses, 12 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 611, 620-30 (1989)
(discussing the inability of philosophical, economic, and natural rights analyses to explain
legal norms).
29. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.1 (2d ed. 1990) (contract law is confined
to exchanges resulting from promise).
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unenforceable for lack of 6onsideration, while an exchange with-
out a promise is merely an instantaneous or simultaneous transac-
tion for which most contract rules are inapplicable.30
Both exchange and promise generate important efficiencies,
but they do so in different ways. Exchange allows the mutually
beneficial movement of resources to their highest and best use.3'
Promise protects reliance expenditures and ensures that property
titles will remain stable over time so that valuable resources will
not be spent on ownership disputes at each stage of a
transaction. 2
In the nondisclosure context, the exchange-based and prom-
ise-based values can be in tension with each other. When a buyer
discovers that the newly purchased house is infested with termites,
the transaction may no longer constitute a mutually beneficial
movement of the house to its highest and best user.33 However,
allowing the buyer to rescind the contract and move out of the
house would entail significant transaction costs in the form of liti-
gation and duplicative moving expenses.
In this sense, the nondisclosure problem is a subset of the
more general question in contract law of why people would volun-
tarily choose to enter into a contract but then refuse to abide by
it. Essentially, there are two reasons for such conduct. First, a
party may be engaging in opportunistic behavior3 4 by, for exam-
ple, refusing to perform their half of the bargain after the other
party has performed. Second, circumstances - tastes, economic
position, or alternatives - may change subsequent to the time of
the promise.
30. See id. at § 1.2 (distinguishing barters from contracts).
31. See Kronman & Posner, Introduction: Economic Theory and Contract Law, in
THE EcONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1, 1-2 (A. Kronman & R. Posner eds. 1989) ("[I]f
voluntary exchanges are permitted resources will gravitate toward their most valuable
uses.")
32. See Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUm. L. REV. 269, 320-21
(1986) (consent theory of contractual obligation protects the promisee's reliance on the
promisor's consent).
33. See Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash. 2d 449, 453, 353 P.2d 672, 675 (1960) (hold-
ing that "[a] termite infestation of a frame building is manifestly a serious and dan-
gerous condition ," that "'justice, equity, and fair dealing' demand[] that
[owners] inform[] prospective purchasers of the condition," and that failure to do so is
sufficient grounds for liability).
34. See generally Muns, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65
MINN. L. REV. 521 (1981) (defining opportunistic behavior as behavior by the performing
party that is inconsistent with the other party's understanding of the contract but not in-
consistent with the terms of the contract).
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In the first instance, permitting the opportunistic breach
would undo the prospects of a mutually beneficial exchange. The
law strongly condemns such breaches, and there may be a trend
toward expanding the penalties for such opportunistic breaches
even further " In the second instance, one of the parties to the
contract has lost the anticipated benefit of the bargain. Here, the
law may excuse performance entirely under the doctrine of mis-
take86 or impracticability 87 In other circumstances, some com-
mentators have suggested compensatory damages as the appropri-
ate sanction for nonperformance resulting from an efficient
breach. 8 Even when the law chooses to substantially penalize of-
fending parties in "changed circumstance" breaches, it does so
with reservation, recognizing that to preserve the security of a
promissory transaction it is occasionally necessary to sacrifice the
goal of attaining an exchange which is beneficial to all parties.8 9
Many of the factors that Professor Keeton has identified are
best understood when viewed through a lens that contrasts mutu-
ally beneficial exchange and the security of promises. Consider the
emphasis on the importance of the nondisclosed fact.40 If the fact
not disclosed is relatively insignificant, the exchange may still be
mutually beneficial, or only slightly to the detriment of one
party 41 The nondisclosure of immaterial facts, on the other hand,
35. See, e.g., Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d
752, 769, 686 P.2d 1158, 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363 (1984) (holding that a party who
breaches a commercial contract and denies in bad faith that a contract exists may also be
subject to tort liability).
36. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1979) (a mistake as to
a basic assumption made by a party when entering into the contract may render the con-
tract voidable).
37. See, e.g., itd. § 261 (impracticability of performance may discharge a party from
the duty to perform).
38. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 24, at 105-07 (in order to isolate "efficient
breaches," the breaching party should be compelled to pay the other party the profits lost
because of the breach).
39. See, e.g., Triple A Contractors v. Rural Water Dist., 226 Kan. 626, 629, 603
P.2d 184, 186 (1979) (holding "that in the absence of fraud, a unilateral mistake does not
excuse the non-performance of a [bid] contract " because "to hold otherwise
would materially weaken the purpose of the bidding procedure," which is to bind the par-
ties so that they may rely on the bids).
40. See W KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 23, § 106, at
739.
41. In other words, the transaction is efficient in a Kaldor-Hicks sense; that is, the
transaction yields benefits to one party in excess of any loss incurred by the other. R.
POSNER, supra note 24, at 12-13 (Kaldor-Hicks is a "less austere concept of efficiency"
than Pareto efficiency).
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is presumably such a common occurrence that prohibiting those
nondisclosures would seriously threaten the security of promissory
transactions.42
As a second example, consider Keeton's emphasis on the dif-
ference in the degree of sophistication of the parties as well as the
extent to which the defect was not discoverable by reasonable
care.43 If the party from whom information is withheld has easy
and well-established access to information about the subject mat-
ter of the contract, then that party may well be the "cheaper cost
avoider."'44 Barring the cheaper cost avoider from rescinding will
give that party an incentive to discover the information, thereby
avoiding substantial degradation of the value of mutually benefi-
cial exchange.
The party with independent access to the information may
not be the cheaper cost avoider in all circumstances. One could
argue that it is virtually costless for a person who already has cer-
tain information to disclose it to the other party 45 On this theory,
efforts by the sophisticated party to arrive at the same information
that the less sophisticated party already possesses would be dupli-
cative and socially wasteful.46 On the other hand, full disclosure of
every defect in one's products may be sufficiently contrary to
human nature that the more realistic cost avoider remains the
party with independent access to the information. 7
An important question is whether the attempt to balance the
policy of promoting mutually beneficial trade against the policy of
ensuring the security of promissory transactions explains the two
42. See Keeton, Fraud, Concealment and Nondisclosure, 15 TEx. L. REv. 1, 32-33
(1936) (arguing that the reasonable person standard reflects "what the man of ordinary
moral sensibilities would have done" and that nondisclosure of certain types of material
information is to be expected and therefore is reasonable).
43. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS. R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 23, § 106 at 739.
44. See R. POSNER, supra note 24, at 99 ("The question of liability for no)disclosure
should turn on which of the parties to the transaction, seller or consumer, can produce or
obtain information at lower cost.").
45. See Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 528 (7th
Cir. 1985) ("Once the duty to disclose exists, and lying or nondisclosure is condemned as
an intentional tort, it no longer matters whether the buyer conducts an investigation well or
at all.").
46. Id. ("The buyer's investigation of things already known to the seller is a wasteful
duplication of effort.").
47. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 363, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (1933)
(president and director of a corporation failed to disclose material information to a share-
holder from whom they purchased stock, yet the court refused to impose a duty to
disclose).
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distinctions noted in section I. Specifically, does the tension be-
tween these policies explain the tendency to punish nondisclosure
by sellers more severely than nondisclosure by buyers and the ten-
dency to punish nondisclosure of intrinsic information more se-
verely than the nondisclosure of extrinsic information 94
Professor Farnsworth has argued that the buyer-seller dis-
tinction is a subset of the general problem of access to informa-
tion: "A court is more likely to expect a party to disclose if that
party has special knowledge or a special means of knowledge not
generally available to those in the position of the other party This
may explain why the burden is more often imposed on sellers than
on buyers."49 If the seller has better access to information about
the property offered for sale, then a rule allowing seller nondisclo-
sure will frustrate many mutually beneficial exchanges, while a
rule allowing buyer nondisclosure will merely force sellers to dis-
cover the information to which they have access.5°
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic information
can also be explained in terms of the exchange-promise dichot-
omy Intrinsic information about the very commodity being sold
may be peculiarly salient to the parties, so that a disclosure duty
backed by sufficient sanctions would prevent exchanges that are
not mutually beneficial. By contrast, a general duty to disclose all
extrinsic information, that is, information pertaining to the gen-
eral environment in which the contract was formed 51 might fail to
generate much disclosure, leaving considerable uncertainty in the
property titles generated by promissory transactions.
The tension between mutually beneficial exchange and the se-
curity of promissory transactions also explains a historical devel-
opment. It is often said that business ethics have matured from an
earlier era of caveat emptor and "every man for himself" individ-
ualism.5 2 Courts have noted this trend in decisions that increas-
48. See supra text accompanying note 28.
49. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 29, § 4.11, at 256 (citation omitted).
50. See 3 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 903 (5th ed.
1941) (The decisions in this area recognize a difference in the information a bryer can
obtain as opposed to a seller because "the seller has better opportunities than anyone else
to know all the material facts concerning his own property, and is thus able under all
ordinary circumstances to protect his own interests.").
51. See supra'text accompanying note 23.
52. See Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1186
(1931) (jurisprudence has recognized a close relationship between imposing caveat emptor
and the development of individualism in this society).
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ingly sanction parties for nondisclosure.53 If contracting parties
feel some ethical duty to disclose information, then it is more
likely that a legal duty to disclose will successfully ensure full dis-
closure. Full disclosure furthers both mutually beneficial exchange
and promissory security to the extent that it is actually prac-
ticed.54 By contrast, if the law were too distant from the moral
code of the era of caveat emptor, it might generate only a partial
compliance, which would leave too many transactions subject to
subsequent litigation.
The duty to disclose in fiduciary relationships might be simi-
larly understood.5 5 For example, codes of ethics and marketplace
realities both require attorneys to perform considerable disclosure
of material facts to their clients. 6 In this ethical milieu, a legal
duty to disclose would arguably ensure that sufficient disclosure
occurs so that few attorney-client contracts would require scrutiny
for fraud. In terms of the exchange-promise dichotomy, the fiduci-
ary settings might be seen as an area where the benefit of mutu-
ally beneficial trade from additional disclosure can be obtained at
little cost in terms of the number of transactions that would be set
aside.
Section I of this article noted that the law could take any of
three positions on nondisclosure: condemnation, approval, or toler-
ance. 7 The exchange-promise framework involves only the first
and third of these reactions. Full disclosure in all transactions is
the ideal: if it occurs, mutually beneficial transactions need not be
set aside. Nondisclosure is tolerated only as a concession to human
frailty that might render a duty to disclose ineffective, thereby
producing uncertainty in the property titles arising from
53. See Note, Reed v. King: Fraudulent Nondisclosure of a Multiple Murder in a
Real Estate Transaction, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 877, 882 (1984) ("For whatever reason,
economics, expectations, or morality, some courts began to hold vendors to a higher stan-
dard of honesty ").
54. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
55. For an argument that fiduciary relationships arise from the voluntary assumption
of a position in which one is to further the interests of another, see Scott, The Fiduciary
Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 540 (1949).
56. "A lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are
made only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations." MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1990). The disciplinary rules establish that "[a]
lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client if they have differing inter-
ests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise his professional judgment
therein for the protection of the client, unless the client has consented after full disclosure."
Id. DR 5-104(A).
57. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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contracts.58
The current framework for the debate of the nondisclosure
issue has offered little support for this practice. At best, nondisclo-
sure is regarded as an evil that must be tolerated because the costs
associated with full disclosure and its enforcement are too great.
In such a framework, it might be that less and less nondisclosure
will be tolerated as business ethics improve. Some observers argue
that the ambit of materiality has been broadened and should be
broadened still further.59 Furthermore, the proposition that there
is no duty to disclose where the uninformed party had an opportu-
nity to discover the withheld information has fallen into disfavor.,0
Similarly, the range of relationships recognized as fiduciary in
character has steadily broadened. 1
Against this backdrop, Anthony Kronman introduced the
ground-breaking argument that nondisclosure of information in
certain circumstances might be a positive measure to which courts
should approvingly defer.6 2 Kronman's highly influential article
changed the nature of the debate regarding the economic utility of
nondisclosure. The next section of this article examines, extends,
and critiques Kronman's conclusions in the context of the distinc-
tion between buyer and seller nondisclosure.
III. THE ASYMMETRY OF BUYER AND SELLER NONDISCLOSURE
In essence, Kronman's theory is that the right to trade with-
out disclosure provides an incentive to acquire valuable informa-
tion.63 In other words, individuals will not incur the cost of ob-
taining information if they must subsequently disclose that
information without compensation to potential trading partners
who have not incurred such costs. Kronman notes that informa-
58. See Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, Error Fraud, Duress and an Epilogue on Le-
sion, 50 LA. L. REv 1, 62, 63 (1989) (examining the duty of full disclosure and concluding
that the standard should not be idealistically set).
59. See, e.g., Shell, Substituting Ethical Standards for Common Law Rules in Com-
mercial Cases: An Emerging Statutory Trend, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 1198, 1232 (1988) (dis-
cussing the relaxed standards that plaintiffs must meet to show a misrepresentation of a
material fact).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
61. See Shell, supra note 59, at 1207-08 ("In the past, the label 'fiduciary' was re-
served for specific, highly dependent relationships In recent years, the concept of
fiduciary duty has begun to appear in cases involving conventional business dealings.").
62. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 1, 9 (1978).
63. See id.
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tion may also be acquired casually, without significant effort or
cost.6 4 In Kronman's view, individuals should be required to dis-
close such information. Since acquiring the information required
little or no effort, a legal duty of disclosure will not deter its
acquisition.6 5
Significantly, Kronman's theory suggests that information
serves a dual function in the market. First, information is a com-
modity Requiring its distribution without compensation is likely
to deter its production, just as a duty to share any other commod-
ity would deter production. Second, adequate information is a
prerequisite to the rational and efficient exchange of other com-
modities. Most of the controversies surrounding nondisclosure
stem from this dual role that information plays in a market
economy 67
Richard Posner has argued that Kronman's theory explains
the distinction between buyer and seller nondisclosure. For exam-
ple, where the seller is aware that the house is infested with ter-
mites, that seller probably "has not invested (much) in discovering
that the house has termites, but acquired the information just as a
byproduct of living there."'8 On the other hand, where the buyer
undertakes the effort and expense of discovering that there is oil
under the seller's land, a duty to disclose would deter such
investigations.6 9
64. See id. at 13-18.
65. Id. at 13-14.
66. This "property in information" view of the nondisclosure phenomenon is de-
fended explicitly in Lawson, The Ethics of insider Trading, I I HARV. J.L. "& PUB. POL'Y
727, 761-66 (1988).
67. See generally Carlton, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Informa-
tion: A Comment, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1980) (discussing the use of information in
making business enterprises productive and markets more efficient); Kitch, The Law and
Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980) (describing
and analyzing the welfare consequences of the law governing the ownership of
information).
68. R. POSNER, supra note 24, at 97.
69. The following cases establish some circumstances under which a prospective pur-
chaser who knows that land contains valuable resources is under no duty to disclose this
information to the seller: Storthz v. Arnold, 74 Ark. 68, 84 S.W 1036 (1905) (purchaser
of land from two "ignorant girls" not obligated to disclose the presence of valuable bauxite
deposits); Zaschak v. Traverse Corp., 123 Mich. App. 126, 333 N.W.2d 191 (1983) (denial
of motion for summary judgment by plaintiff affirmed because plaintiff failed to support
the assertion that the defendant had a duty to disclose the potential presence of oil and gas
on the property); Crowley v. C.N. Nelson Lumber Co., 66 Minn. 400, 69 N.W 321 (1896)
(lumber company was not required to tell seller of the presence of valuable iron ore on land
used to grow timber); Caples v. Steel, 4 Or. 491 (1879) (purchaser did not have a duty to
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Kronman has moved the discussion of nondisclosure in the
right direction, but in certain respects his theory is unsatisfactory
Suppose, for example, that the owner of a house decided to do a
termite inspection in order to sell it before the condition becomes
obvious to purchasers. Would the fact that the seller deliberately
sought this information constitute sufficient ground to permit the
sale of the house without disclosure 9
Alternatively, suppose that an art history professor attending
a garage sale noticed a painting that she recognized as an original
work of art, while the seller believed the painting was only a
print.7 0 As an original work of art, the painting would be worth
tens of thousands of dollars, far beyond the ability of the pur-
chaser to pay Should the law require that the professor refrain
from purchasing the painting without disclosure of this informa-
tion on the theory that it was acquired casually 9
The risk is that a legal duty to disclose or refrain from trad-
ing would lead the professor to refrain rather than disclose. Unless
the professor is altruistic, which is not typically assumed in either
economic or legal analysis, she would have no incentive to disclose
the information. 71 She could try to sell the information by saying
"I have information that will make you thousands of dollars and I
will reveal it to you if you agree to give me half of the money I
make for you." The problem with this strategy is that it is difficult
to sell the information without divulging it.7 2 The seller might
conclude that the paintings must be valuable after all and refuse
to sell them. Alternatively, the seller might conclude that the
buyer is not serious or is attempting to take some of the profit that
the seller would have received at a later time, and decline the
offer
disclose the presence of a valuable coal mine on the seller's property).
70. For an analysis of civil law cases raising this fact pattern, see Litvinoff, supra
note 58, at 65-66. Of course, the professor had to deliberately acquire her own training, but
this investment would still be a case of casually acquired information in Kronman's termi-
nology if the training was acquired in order to pursue a teaching career rather than make
trading gains.
71. I have discussed the assumption of self-interest as a part of Thomas Sowell's
"constrained vision" elsewhere. See Wonnell, Causal and Normative Underpinnings of Le-
gal Controversies: The Constrained Vision of Thomas Sowell, 21 U.C. DAVis L. REV.
1009, 1018 (1988).
72. This problem, as well as possible market adaptations to it, is discussed in Kitch,
supra note 67, at 707 (suggesting that "[t]here are contractual solutions to [the] prob-
lem[]. The negotiating parties can enter into a contract specifying the information to be
disclosed and what can and cannot be done with it, even if no deal is made.").
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As the hypothetical suggests, it is not sufficient for the buyer
to acquire information about resources that are being used inef-
ficiently It is equally important that the buyer act on the infor-
mation by entering into a contract of purchase rather than idly
withhold the information. A duty to disclose has the undesirable
tendency to discourage the actual use of the information she has
acquired, especially where such use entails significant cost.
If the buyer does not acquire the painting, the resource will
remain in the hands of a person who does not know important
facts about it. The ramifications for efficient resource use are evi-
dent. A party who does not know that a painting is an original
work of art may not care for it properly, secure it, or use it prop-
erly -for example, by showing it privately or donating it to a
museum.7 3 In general, a party who is unaware of the material
properties of a resource will not be motivated to make proper use
of that resource or to acquire appropriate complementary
resources.
The gain in efficiency comes about from the merger of the
resource and the information. Physical resources are valuable only
when coupled with information. The hypothetical art buyer unites
information and the physical resource; indeed, this is the source of
her profit. By contrast, a seller who parts with a termite-infested
house profits from the temporary severance of the resource and
the information. Furthermore, because the buyer will not know to
take remedial action until the infestation becomes obvious, the
lack of information will likely result in even greater social costs,
which are borne by the buyer.
This difference between profiting from the merger of infor-
mation and resources and profiting from their severance is the
fundamental distinction between buyer and seller nondisclosure.
On the other hand, it is important to note that in many contracts
the buyer also acts as a "seller" of its own creditworthiness, or the
ability to pay when the obligation becomes due. A buyer who fails
to disclose material facts pertaining the buyer's own solvency is in
this respect analogous to the seller who fails to disclose material
73. On the importance of information to ensuring that efficient decisions pertaining
to property are undertaken, see Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 4 (1980); Note, Imposing Tort Liability on Real Estate Brokers Selling Defective
Housing, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 1867-71 (1986) (suggesting that a broker is best suited
to provide information that will lead to efficient real estate transactions).
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facts about defects in the product being offered. 4 Thus, disclosure
confers efficiency benefits where one seeks to profit from the sever-
ance of information and resources, regardless of that individual's
status as buyer or seller.
It is important to relate this account of buyer nondisclosure
to the factors that Professor Keeton enumerated. Many of these
factors do not make sense in buyer nondisclosure cases and should
not be employed.
For example, Keeton emphasizes the importance of the non-
disclosed fact.70 But, in the case of buyer nondisclosure, the more
material the information, the greater the inefficiency resulting
from the failure to merge the information and the resource. For
example, consider a French case in which a purchaser acquired a
painting by a great master from a seller who was unaware of the
painting's value. 71 Subsequent to the sale, the buyer discovered
the value of the painting and resold it to the Louvre." The French
court refused to grant the rescission sought by the seller on the
grounds of his error because the painting had been resold. Instead,
the court granted the seller considerable damages equal to the dif-
ference between the buyer's purchase price and the price obtained
from the museum.78 Unfortunately, the court ignored the fact that
the materiality of the new information merely highlights the ma-
teriality of the prior inefficiency of resource use.
Since the relevant distinction is between merger and sever-
ance of information and resources, it is inappropriate to focus on
factors such as "the difference in the degree of intelligence of the
parties" or the extent to which the information was "not discover-
able by reasonable care."' 79 An owner of land may not realize that
it is oil bearing, or may lack access to the information that would
yield this knowledge. Nevertheless, the absence of this information
causes the resource to be inefficiently underused; considerable so-
cial utility gains could result from the purchase of the land by one
who knows it is oil-bearing.
This result may not fit comfortably with individualist moral
74. See, e.g., Manly v. Ohio Shoe Co., 25 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1928) (seller may
rescind sales contract where buyer concealed its insolvency).
75. See W KEETON. D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 23, § 106, at
739.
76. See Litvinoff, supra note 58, at 42-43.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. W KEETON. D. DOBBS. R. KEETON & D. OWENS, supra note 23, § 106, at 739.
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intuitions.80 However, the- value of property is a function of the
creative insights that human beings bring to the physical objects
they control.8 ' The owner of the land was paid a fair price for
every use to which the owner was able to put the land. There is no
compelling normative reason that entitles the owner to the profits
derived from the creative insights of the buyer regarding addi-
tional uses for the parcel of land.
Section II of this article generally defended Professor Kee-
ton's list of factors on the theory of balancing the exchange-based
and the promise-based factors in contract law 82 Those factors do
not fit the buyer nondisclosure problem because the same trade-off
between these values is not involved. Buyer nondisclosure assists
the process of moving the resource to its highest and best use,
which is the social justification for the system of exchange. There-
fore, denying rescission for nondisclosure to sellers promotes both
the exchange-based and the security of transactions values.
This theory, which generally treats buyer nondisclosure as
privileged, comports more closely with the existing law than Pro-
fessor Keeton's factors - despite the fact that one of Professor
Keeton's factors is whether the buyer or the seller is the nondis-
closing party While there are exceptions, the courts have gener-
ally been tolerant of buyer nondisclosure even in cases where the
other factors point toward requiring disclosure.83 Again, this is be-
cause buyer nondisclosure is not simply one -factor among -many,
but neutralizes or reverses the significance of other factors in the
calculus.
This article has, thus far, discussed three bases for distin-
guishing between buyer and seller nondisclosure. Section II tried
80. At least one court has refused to grant specific performance to a purchaser of oil-
bearing land who failed to disclose that fact to an apparently unsophisticated seller. See
Schlegel v. Moorhead, 170 Mont. 391, 553 P.2d 1009 (1976).
81. Thomas Sowell has criticized the "physical fallacy," which he defines as the be-
lief that a particular physical entity possesses a constant value independent of the uses to
which humans put it. See T. SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DEcisiONs 67-72 (1980).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 29-61.
83. See generally Furman v. Brown, 227 Mich. 629, 199 N.W 703 (1924) (disa-
greement as to the value of land during negotiations is not evidence of fraudulent induce-
ment); Stuart v. Dorow, 216 Mich. 591, 185 N.W 662 (1921) (no duty to disclose the
purpose for which land was being purchased); Zaschak v. Traverse Corp., 123 Mich. App.
126, 129, 333 N.W.2d 191, 193 (1983) ("Michigan courts have not yet recognized a duty
on the part of a vendee to disclose facts relevant to the value of the real estate in question
even when specifically asked."); Annotation, Duty of Purchaser of Real Property to Dis-
close to the Vendor Facts or Prospects Affecting the Value of the Property, 56 A.L.R. 429
(1928).
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to fit that distinction into the exchange-promise framework, argu-
ing that sellers generally have better access to information than
buyers. 4 Kronman and Posner assert that sellers generally acquire
their information casually while buyers generally acquire their in-
formation deliberately 86 This section has argued that sellers profit
from the socially destructive severance of the resource and the in-
formation, while buyers profit from their socially constructive
merger.
The choice among these three theories of buyer nondisclosure
has considerable ramifications. In cases where the buyer has easier
access to information, the "access to information" theory would
presumably call for mandatory disclosure.86 Moreover, access to
information could presumably be outweighed by the other factors
in the exchange - promise calculus. The "deliberate discovery"
theory requires buyers to disclose information that they discover
casually, resulting in a perverse incentive for the buyer to refrain
frdm making use of the information. Since these ideas have
tempted the courts,8 7 it is essential to recognize that the case for
buyer nondisclosure is not dependent upon such empirical
regularities.
IV NONDISCLOSURE OF EXTRINSIC INFORMATION
A. Capturing the External Benefits of Activities
Insider trading in securities is a particular type of contractual
nondisclosure that illustrates the problem of capturing the exter-
nal benefits of activities. While the common law generally permit-
ted insider trading, federal securities laws have been interpreted to
impose upon corporate insiders a duty to either disclose material
facts or refrain from trading their corporation's shares.,
Professor Henry Manne has argued that insider trading in
securities serves valuable social functions and should be permit-
84. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
86. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 29, § 4.11, at 241. ("[A] court is more likely to
expect a party to disclose if he has special knowledge or a special means of knowledge not
generally available to those in the position of the other party."); supra text accompanying
notes 49-50 (discussing situations where the seller has better access to information.).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
88. See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F Supp. 808, 828-32 (D. Del. 1951)
(interpreting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988)); supra text
accompanying note 7 (discussing insider trading as a focus of statutes governing the sale of
securities).
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ted. 9 One of these functions is that insider trading can be a
method for inducing corporate managers to engage in en-
trepreneurial activity, since insiders will be able to buy shares
before they engage in the activity and sell at a profit afterwards.90
One criticism of Manne's argument is that insider trading
would allow insiders to profit by selling on bad news, which would
give them a perverse incentive to operate the corporation so as to
generate bad news.91 This argument presupposes that the law
must take the same attitude toward purchasing and selling on the
basis of inside information. However, the original federal securi-
ties laws regulated only the seller of securities, and the Rule 1Ob-
582 prohibition on purchasers was added later under pressure from
the staff of the SEC.9 3 If selling on inside information is undesir-
able because it gives insiders an incentive to take corporate ac-
tions that reduce shareholder value, it is difficult to oppose the
argument that insider purchases, in fact, create the opposite
incentive.
It is also argued that insider trading would give corporate in-
siders an incentive to delay the disclosure of materially favorable
information. 4 If Manne's thesis is correct it is difficult to see this
89. See H. MANNE. INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKETS at v (1966) ("The
present work largely defend[s] insider trading.").
90. See Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547,
578-79 (1970).
91. See Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Non-
public Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1095 (1985) (emphasizing a manager's interest in
volatile stock prices and potential manipulation of media releases to accentuate volatility);
see also Schotland, Unsafe at any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the
Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1453 (1967) (arguing that even if insider trading
profits would not "induce affirmative creation of failures," anything that dilutes the incen-
tive to avoid failure should be eliminated).
92. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990) (adopted 13 Fed. Reg. 8,183 (1948)).
93. See Freeman, General Discussion, 22 Bus. LAW. 914, 922 (1967) (drafter of
Rule lob-5 commenting that the rule was added to the federal securities laws following the
suggestion of SEC officials); Scott, Insider Trading: Rule lOb-5, Disclosure and Corporate
Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 801-02 (1980) (the rule was developed when the SEC staff
heard reports of a company president buying the company's stock after telling the share-
holders that the company was in financial trouble).
94. See Levmore, In Defense of the Regulation of Insider 'Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 101, 103 (1988) (insiders will preserve the advantage of superior knowledge as
long as possible to exploit the market). A related argument is that insider trading might
delay the transmission of information from one person to another within an organization.
See Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large
Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1054-55 (1982) (arguing that the recipient of good
or bad news would delay reporting the news until the recipient exercised the opportunity to
buy or sell company stock).
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as a serious reason for prohibiting insider trading. The discovery
of a new production process, a new product line or technological
development, or a new possibility for profitable mergers or spin-
offs, surely constitutes a net benefit for shareholders even if the
disclosure of that benefit is delayed for the short time it would
take to make trading profits.
Other criticisms of allowing insider trading have been made9 5
and answered96 elsewhere. Rather than pursuing these lines of in-
quiry solely in the context of insider trading of securities, it is
important to examine the general type of argument which Manne
is making, in order to see whether it might have more general
applications to other types of contractual nondisclosure.
Essentially, Manne's point is that corporate managers have
the power to take actions which confer benefits on others - the
shareholders. This includes discovering some potentially profitable
activity as well as acting on that discovery to bring it to fruition.
Shareholders should, therefore, be willing to compensate manag-
ers for this activity However, it is often difficult after the fact for
shareholders or their agents to identify precisely which manager
played what role in bringing any particular entrepreneurial benefit
to the company Unlike stock benefit plans or bonuses, insider
trading is self-regulating: an insider who was in a position to con-
tribute would be able to take advantage of the opportunity by
buying shares."
95. It is argued, for example, that with bonuses and other compensation devices,
insider trading is an unnecessary method of compensating entrepreneurs. See Mendelson,
The Economics of Insider Trading Reconsidered, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 470, 489 (1969)
(those employees most likely to be in a position to profit from insider trading would also be
likely to get offers to work for competitors); Seligman, supra note 91, at 1095 (insider
trading may reward an entrepreneur who did not contribute to the value of the enterprise).
96. It is argued that many people other than the original entrepreneur will have
access to the information and will be able to benefit from insider trading. See Easterbrook,
Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Informa-
tion, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 309, 333 (noting the expense firms incur to protect information
from outside "snoopers"). The argument that non-entrepreneurs will derive benefits, which
can in principle be controlled by contract, confronts the fact that "empirical evidence sug-
gests that trading profits are positively correlated with position in the firms - the more
important the position, the greater the trading profits." Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation
of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 878 (1983). -On the inadequacy of alternative
compensation schemes, see id. at 870-71 ("The unique advantage of insider trading is that
it allows a manager to alter his compensation package in light of new knowledge, thereby
avoiding continual renegotiation. The manager, in effect, 'renegotiates' each time he
trades.").
97. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 96, at 878 (arguing that insider trading is
less inefficient than other compensation schemes).
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Manne's argument can be given a more general structure.
One individual, A, is in a position to discover information and
subsequently take an action which would, at least in part, inure to
the benefit of another individual, B. Because of the externality in-
volved, A may not be willing to undertake the action unless com-
pensation can be obtained.98 However, A perceives that high
transaction costs would preclude B from making such a payment
if the contemplated activity were disclosed. Moreover, A fears
that disclosure to B might cause B to raise the selling price of B's
own position in the hope that A will undertake the activity with-
out B's help. Accordingly, A does not disclose the opportunity but
purchases B's position. A can then internalize the benefits of the
contemplated activity and will be willing to undertake the neces-
sary efforts to bring it to fruition.9"
The formal structure of Manhe's argument arises in many
settings other than insider trading in securities. Consider, for ex-
ample, the facts of a leading real estate nondisclosure case, Stan-
dard Steel Car Co. v Stamm.100 Standard Steel intended to
purchase land abutting the defendant's property in order to erect
a factory In conjunction with the factory construction, a railway
line was to be extended out to the two properties; this line was a
critical element since the rail provided the most cost effective
means of transporation in 1905. Standard Steel purchased the de-
fendant's land without disclosing its intention of building a factory
on the adjoining land. After building the factory, the market value
of the land purchased from the defendant increased by 100% 101
The seller sued to rescind the contract- of sale on the grounds of
nondisclosure, but the court held for the buyer.
Manne's theory can help to explain this result. Standard
Steel was contemplating an activity which would confer an exter-
nal benefit on Stamm's property Standard might have disclosed
its intention to Stamm in the hope of obtaining a payment from
Stamm, but doing so would have entailed significant risks. For in-
98. See Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules
Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 9, 19 (1984) (suggesting the existence of
externalities in the insider trading area).
99. The use of property rights to internalize externalities is discussed in Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347, 348 (1967).
100. 207 Pa. 419, 56 A. 954 (1904).
101. Id. at 420-21, 56 A. at 954 (although the railroad would capture in fees a part
of the benefit conferred on neighboring landowners, the fact that land prices increased
suggests that much of the benefit was not internalized through those fees.)
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stance, as a result of disclosure, Stamm probably would have re-
fused to pay Standard Steel for the construction of a factory It is
likely that the owners of several other properties would benefit
from the construction of the new factory and rail line, and Stamm
might have tried to "free ride" on the contributions of others. Al-
ternatively, Stamm could have concluded that Standard Steel was
bluffing and would build the factory whether Stamm paid or not.
He then would be in a position to receive the benefits while bear-
ing no cost. Another risk inherent in disclosure is that Stamm
would refuse to commit to a fee arrangement unless Standard
Steel demonstrated its commitment to the construction of the fac-
tory by investing time and capital in construction plans. With
knowledge of such plans, Stamm could have offered a modest pay-
ment, capitalizing on the fixed cost of Standard's prior planning.
Finally, had the intended construction of the factory been dis-
closed to Stamm, he would have raised the price of his land since
he could have logically concluded that there was a high
probability that the factory would be built either with Standard's
own money or with that of others in the community Thus, a deci-
sion to inform Stamm in the hopes of securing his payment would
jeopardize Standard's goal of internalizing the benefits of the
activity
The previous two sections considered ideal types in that each
was analyzed under a distinct factual characterization. Section III
examined nondisclosure in the context of the seller's underutiliza-
tion of property 102 Section IV has analyzed the problem of exter-
nalities generated by the buyer's activities and the effect of non-
disclosure on encouraging those activities.0 3 Situations arise,
however, in which both fact patterns and their characteristic
problems are present to some degree.
As examples of such "hybrid" fact situations, consider Burt
v Mason'°4 and Boyd v Leith. 05 In both cases the buyers, as
agents for the railroad, actively sought to induce the construction
of a railroad line. Both buyers purchased property near the in-
tended site of the line, which subsequently appreciated in value
when the railroad was built. The sellers sought to rescind the con-
tracts of sale on nondisclosure grounds, but the courts refused to
102. See supra text accompanying notes 63-87.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 88-101.
104. 97 Mich. 127, 56 N.W 365 (1893).
105. 50 S.W 618 (Tex. App. 1899).
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grant rescission.1°8
If one discounts the role of the buyers in bringing about the
construction of a railroad line, the economics of these cases be-
come complicated. The sellers, unaware of the planned railroad,
might make inappropriate reliance decisions pertaining to the
land. However, the sellers presumably would acquire the informa-
tion at some point in the foreseeable future. Consequently, these
situations are distinguishable from those in which the seller will
probably remain uninformed for an extended period, such as when
the seller did not know the land contained oil. These considera-
tions indicate that the buyer may not be a higher-value user of the
land located near the site of a potential railroad when compared
to the seller.
If the buyers play an important role in bringing about the
construction of a railroad line, the analysis is different. Construc-
tion of a railroad creates external benefits for adjoining properties.
The railroad corporation may have wanted to purchase those
properties itself, in which case the agents who purchase might be
guilty of usurpation of corporate opportunities. 10 7 But if there is
no indication that the corporation had intended to purchase such
lands, the shareholders of the corporation could benefit from hav-
ing their agents buy those lands in lieu of the full salary they
would otherwise demand to work at the firm. As a result of this
benefit, the right to trade without disclosure becomes an incentive
to construct enterprises, such as railroads, that confer external
benefits.
B. Nondisclosure of Information Affecting Supply or Demand
An important nondisclosure problem concerns the duty to dis-
close extrinsic facts that influence the supply or demand, and thus
the price, of a particular commodity The leading case addressing
this problem is Laidlaw v Organ,08 which involved a tobacco pur-
chaser who was aware that a peace treaty had just been signed,
ending the War of 1812 and therefore ending the naval blockade
that had been holding down the price of tobacco. The Court, in an
106. See Boyd, 50 S.W at 619-20; Burt, 97 Mich. at 128-29, 56 N.W at 365.
107. See Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949) (an officer of
a corporation is in a fiduciary position with respect to that corporation and consequently
has a duty to refrain from using confidential information acquired as a result of that rela-
tionship for personal profit).
108. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
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opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, stated that nondisclosure by
the buyer was not actionable.109 The Court observed that a duty
to disdlose would be "difficult to circumscribe within proper
limits," since both parties had equal access to the information, 1°
but cautioned that "each party must take care not to say or do
any thing tending to impose upon the other."1 '
In evaluating the efficiency of the nondisclosure rules pertain-
ing to extrinsic, market-oriented information in a situation like
Laidlaw, it is useful to observe a basic distinction. The costs asso-
ciated with being uninformed in an absolute sense are distinct
from the costs associated with being less informed than a trading
partner. An absolute ignorance of facts affecting supply or de-
mand can be costly in terms of both private and social wealth. A
party who is not aware that the war is over and the price of to-
bacco is about to rise will make improper economic decisions.
Such a party would use tobacco when it would be more sensible to
store it11 2 and plant other crops when it would be more efficient to
plant tobacco.
It is tempting to view these private and social costs of igno-
rance as attending a nondisclosure rule. Arguably, a law backed
by substantial sanctions will encourage disclosure, ensuring that
both parties would be informed that the war was over Inefficient
economic decisions based upon an erroneous assumption that the
price of tobacco will remain depressed would be avoided by a full
disclosure regime.
This argument against nondisclosure is fundamentally mis-
conceived. When it is necessary for the parties to actively pursue
the information about the peace treaty, Kronman's thesis suggests
that a disclose-or-refrain rule would prevent the acquisition of
that information by either party 113 Moreover, had the informa-
tion about the peace treaty been acquired casually, a. known re-
quirement that a party disclose such information would have
caused the contracting party to idly withhold the information
109. Id. at 195.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Peck, The Economic Role of Traditional Commodities Futures Markets,
in FUTURES MARKETS: THEIR ECONOMIC ROLE 1, 40-51 (A. Peck ed. 1985) (discussing the
potential effect of storage costs on the price of an agricultural commodity).
113. Kronman, supra note 62, at 13-14 (suggesting that the level of investment for
obtaining information is directly proportional to the benefit derived from possessing the
information).
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rather than act on it." 4 In either case, a disclose-or-refrain rule
would lead to a decision to refrain from trading, not to disclose.
The argument that nondisclosure is undesirable because of
the social costs of market ignorance is false; indeed, just the oppo-
site is true. To avoid erroneous economic decisions, it is not essen-
tial that a contracting party be aware that a peace treaty has been
signed. It is essential, however, that such a party be aware that
the market price of tobacco will increase in the future. Speculative
trading raises the price of the goods and thus sends the correct
signal to the seller.11 5 Because it would deter trading, a rule of full
disclosure would deter the transactions necessary to send pricing
signals.
The distinction that the law draws between "intrinsic" and
"extrinsic" information is an imperfect way of capturing this basic
phenomenon. In the case of intrinsic information, such as the fact
that a house has termites, a prospective buyer can make economi-
cally efficient decisions only when in possession of the actual infor-
mation; a pricing proxy for that knowledge will not do. The buyer
only knows to remedy the termite problem upon independently ac-
quiring access to the information. By contrast, truly extrinsic in-
formation is information that is relevant precisely because of its
effect on market prices, and thus the pricing effect of trades can
substitute for the information itself in encouraging efficient
decisions.
It does not follow, however, that there are no economic costs
associated with insider trading. It is necessary to. distinguish be-
tween the costs of ignorance in an absolute sense and the costs of
being more ignorant than one's trading partner. The former set of
costs is not a disadvantage but an advantage of a nondisclosure
regime. The second set of costs may be a disadvantage and should
be explored. In Laidlaw v Organ,16 three types of costs could
have been attributed to the fact that the buyer was more fully
informed of extrinsic facts than the seller. First, the differential
knowledge may account for the transaction itself, with attendant
transaction costs such as meeting, inspecting the tobacco, entering
114. See supra text accompanying notes 70-73 (discussing this problem in the con-
text of a painting not known to be valuable).
115. See R. POSNER, supra note 24, at 97 (discussing Laidlaw and the effect on
prices of revealing some inside information); Seligman, supra note 91, at 1092 (arguing
that higher prices will lead to increased production).
116. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
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into an agreement, and shipping the tobacco. It is also possible
that the seller would have sold to another purchaser had Laidlaw
not entered the market, but the possibility cannot be ignored that
Laidlaw's favorable price induced a transaction that otherwise
would not have taken place.
Second, there are the costs of becoming more informed than
one's trading partners. Laidlaw had to spend time and money cul-
tivating a network of contacts to keep him informed about peace
negotiation developments.17 The prospect of being induced to
enter into a transaction at a price below that which an informed
seller would receive will inspire sellers to become informed as well.
Considerable duplication of effort could arise as handlers attempt
to become better informed or avoid being less informed than other
traders.
Third, because Laidlaw was motivated by a desire for specu-
lative gain, Laidlaw may not have been a more efficient handler of
the tobacco than Organ. Like all commodities, "tobacco" is not a
wholly generic commodity; each specific holding is likely to have
its own quality characteristics, as well as the transportation costs
of moving the commodity to local markets that are facing tempo-
rary shortages.'18 Laidlaw may not have possessed storage facili-
ties or skills in evaluating specific holdings of tobacco equivalent
to Organ's (or the party to whom Organ would otherwise have
sold the tobacco). The Laidlaw rule causes commodity handlers to
be speculators, and speculators to be handlers. Costs of under-
specialization arise from a transaction that otherwise might not
have taken place. For these reasons, there are costs associated
with insider trading beyond the spurious costs associated with an
absolute ignorance of market conditions.
Ironically, however, many of these costs can also be seen as a
product of too little speculative trading rather than too much, and
it is important to explore the reasons. The costs of insider trading
stem primarily from relating a speculative motive to the costly
handling of commodities. The fact that speculators become owners
and handlers of the commodity substantially increases the trans-
action costs of the trade itself." 9 If speculators must be handlers,
117. Id. at 182-83.
118. See F HAYEK, Socialist Calculation II: The State of the Debate, in INDIVIDU-
ALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 148, 153-54 (1948) (arguing that an efficient economic plan
must take into account the individuality of each "batch" of a commodity).
119. Documents of title, such as warehouse receipts, can remove the need for physi-
[Vol. 41:329
THEORY OF NONDISCLOSURE
there will be limits on their ability to specialize in the speculative
skill, and duplication of effort will arise as each handler attempts
to become a part-time speculator. Finally, the costs of the specula-
tors' mishandling or misuse of nongeneric holdings of commodities
are also attributable to the relation between speculation and
handling.
The market has a tendency to seek to control costs of under-
specialization resulting from the combination of the speculation
and handling functions. One of the most important market adap-
tations has been the development of futures markets for many im-
portant commodities. 120 For other commodities, forward markets
with characteristics similar to formal futures exchanges have
evolved.
1 2 1
No formal futures market has developed for tobacco, in large
part because tobacco prices have been heavily controlled through
a government program of quotas, price supports, and purchases of
surplus crops . 22 While programs of this nature serve as an alter-
native means of controlling the costs of speculation, they operate
at high cost. Surplus stocks of tobacco represent a social waste, as
does the tendency to grow crops on inferior land because that is
where the governmental quota system permits it.12a Therefore, the
analysis continues with a commodity such as corn where rapid
price changes remain a real phenomenon and where futures mar-
kets have developed fully 124
cal handling of the commodities. However, the owner of the commodity still bears responsi-
bility for ascertaining the ultimate best use and proper sales price for a nongeneric sample
of a particular commodity.
120. A futures market is "[a] market in which contracts for the future delivery of
commodities are bought and sold A futures contract is an agreement to deliver or to
receive some commodity at a specified price at some specified future time." C. AMMER &
D. AMMER, DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 173 (1977).
121. See J. WILLIAMS, THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF FUTURES MARKETS 164-66
(1986) ("The actual differences between forward and futures markets are small For-
ward markets, not futures markets, are generally the first to standardize the size of lots,
the grades allowed for delivery, and the circumstances of delivery such as whether in rail-
cars or in elevators.")
122. See Mann, The Tobacco Franchisefor Whom?, in THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY IN
TRANSITION at 37, 37-38 (W Finger ed. 1981) (discussing the governmental regulation of
the tobacco industry).
123. See id. There is some flexibility in "selling" one's quota to other lands, but the
program generally requires that the subject property be located in the same county as the
farmer who had the original quota. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 1314b (West 1988 & Supp. 1990).
124. For evidence of the absence of such price changes in tobacco, see Louisville
Courier-Journal, Nov. 20, 1988, § E, at I, col. 4 ("If recent sales history is any indicator,
some of the most common grades of burley [tobacco] will bring only $1 to $2 above the
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Futures markets unleash the force of speculative insider trad-
ing. 125 One who believes the price of corn will increase can acquire
a long position in the futures contract. 126 If the price does rise, the
speculator realizes a profit by acquiring an offsetting short posi-
tion in the market. Physical commodities rarely change hands,
and there is no need for storage or for speculators to act as han-
dlers. Moreover, futures are traded in homogeneous commodities
and, as a result, are remarkably liquid. 21 7 Because large volumes
of trading can be accommodated readily, individuals can afford to
become specialists in the market forces affecting the supply or de-
mand of commodities such as corn. 2
Professor Jeffrey Williams has argued that the function of
futures markets is to serve as an implicit market for the "borrow-
ing" of commodities. 2 9 The common practice of handlers buying
a commodity on the spot market while simultaneously taking a
short position in the futures market is, in economic reality, bor-
rowing the commodity from the market for the interim period of
time. 30 As with any loan, a handler who borrows a commodity in
order to satisfy inventory needs incurs a cost. The spread between
spot prices and futures prices amounts to an "interest rate" for
the borrowing of particular commodities for particular periods of
time. Like monetary interest rates, this spread encourages han-
price support when the annual auctions start tomorrow.").
125. Again, this is insider trading in the economic, not the legal, sense of that term.
The information to which commodity speculators have access may be sufficiently public,
but the insight into how that information will affect prices is itself a form of information
that most people cannot obtain at low cost.
126. A "long" position is a contractual obligation to purchase a particular commod-
ity intended for future delivery. A "short" position is a contractual obligation to deliver a
particular commodity, which the person may not currently own, at a set date in the future
at a particular price. See G. KAUFMAN, THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM: MONEY. MARKETS,
AND INSTITUTIONS 397 (3d ed. 1986). Because the price is fixed, those who have acquired a
long position benefit when the price of the commodity increases, while those who have
taken a short position benefit from price decreases.
127. See Telser, Why There Are Organized Future Markets, 24 J. LAW & ECON. I,
54 (1981) ("An organized futures market is a device for making a futures contract a
highly liquid instrument of trade.").
128. See id. at 12 (arguing that because the focus is now on the price of a commod-
ity and the forces affecting it, "[flamiliarity with the properties of the commodity and the
preferences of the principal is not necessary").
129. See J. WILLIAMS, supra note 121, at 236 ("Loan markets, whether for money or
for commodities, allocate scarce inventories to the firms whose need for them is greatest at
the moment. Through the hurly-burly of futures trading, prices emerge, with remarkable
order and allocative sophistication, for interest rates on commodity loans.").
130. See id. at 149 ("Firms buy and sell futures contracts as part of more complex
transactions that leave them implicitly borrowing commodities.").
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dlers to control their inventories and to ration them to those han-
dlers with a need to have such inventories at hand.131
It is not entirely accurate to describe the handlers who buy
on the spot market and simultaneously sell a futures contract-as
borrowing the commodity Such handlers are the owners of a non-
generic holding of the commodity As a result, they can benefit
from their own expertise regarding the use and sale of specific
holdings of corn in specific places. By contrast, the short position
in the futures market removes any concern over market develop-
ments having an across-the-board effect on holdings of corn.
132
Perhaps it would be more accurate to describe the handlers as
borrowing the generic "corn" portion of their concrete holdings of
corn.
The development of such futures markets substantially lowers
the cost of the amateur speculation evidenced in Laidlaw 13 3 Han-
dlers of the commodities who wish to avoid incurring the costs of
becoming expert speculators can do so by hedging their position in
the futures markets. 34 Even if such handlers do not hedge, the
prices quoted in the spot markets are heavily influenced by the
governing futures prices.135 Consequently, handlers can benefit in-
directly from the competition of professional speculators to deter-
mine market prices. There will be little or no information left for
the Laidlaws of the world to withhold from the Organs that is not
processed into market prices. Speculators in the futures markets
do not incur costs associated with trying to be handlers or experts
in nongeneric holdings of commodities. The transaction costs of
speculative trades in the futures markets, as measured by bid-ask
spreads, are remarkably low 136
Ironically, the costs of insider trading can be reduced by le-
131. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
132. The use of put options to achieve these protections against the price decline of
assets one may already hold is discussed in Stoll & Whaley, The New Option Markets, in
FUTURES MARKETS: THEIR ECONOMIC ROLE, supra note 112, at 205-28.
133. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 188.
134. The utility of financial futures markets for hedging purposes is discussed in
Silber, The Economic Role of Financial Futures, in FUTURES MARKETS: THEIR ECONOMIC
ROLE, supra note 112, at 83, 98-107.
135. See Peck, supra note I12, at 73 ("Futures prices are the referent prices in all
transactions, whether they are for immediate or delayed delivery, because they provide a
standardized, competitively determined reflection of underlying current and future
value.").
136. See Telser, supra note 127, at 5-6, 12 (discussing transaction costs and compar-
ing.speculative and nonspeculative costs as they relate to information gathering).
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gitimizing, professionalizing, and expanding the scope of specula-
tion. Costs are not completely eliminated; speculative transactions
always generate at least minimal transaction costs. Nevertheless,
given the benefit of ensuring that prices reflect impending scarci-
ties, and thereby cause handlers to adjust their inventories, the
remaining costs of nondisclosure are reduced to a more acceptable
level.
Speculative trading always entails costs. However, it is un-
clear whether particular categories of speculative transactions
should be proscribed. In Laidlaw, for example, the Court stressed
that the information about the end of the war was equally accessi-
ble to both sides. 13 7 Securities laws attempt to distinguish between
"material" nondisclosures, such as a corporate merger, and "im-
material" nondisclosures, such as the economic consequences of a
known merger.1"8 Do distinctions of this nature make sense given
the costs and benefits of speculative trading9
These standards incorrectly portray the circumstances under
which prohibitions on speculative trading are desirable.,," Infor-
mation not equally available to all parties 40 may still be of con-
siderable use to handlers of the commodities; if so, a ban on such
information-based trading would deter the transactions that gen-
erate needed pricing signals.,"' Similarly, from the standpoint of
price implications, one can make larger and more material errors
from incorrectly analyzing the economic effect of a known event
than from being unaware of the event's existence.' 42
137. Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 195; see Seligman, supra note 91, at 1093
(establishing the values of different types of information in the securities market).
138. See Seligman, supra note 91, at 1123 (comparing the effect of material and
immaterial disclosure on a security analyst's incentive to search for new information).
139. See Easterbrook, supra note 96, at 330 (discussing optimal use/optimal produc-
tion problems surrounding insider trading); Lawson, supra note 66, at 756 (arguing that
rather than focusing on a distinction between lawful and unlawful access, the distinction
should be based on an individual's cost of obtaining information).
140. This "access to information" point is stressed in Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders,
and Informational Advantages under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. REV. 322,
363 (1979).
141. In the context of trading in stocks, it has recently been argued that pricing
signals do not serve an important allocative function. See Stout, The Unimportance of
Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regula-
tion, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1988). Professor Stout's provocative thesis depends, however,
on the absence of arbitrage possibilities between the stock and asset markets. If leveraged
buy outs and other techniques of arbitrage can exploit gaps between the value of stock and
the value of the corresponding assets, the cost of those transactions is an inefficiency of the
pricing structure.
142. For a summary of commonly made errors in fundamental analysis, see J.
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If speculative trading is prohibited, the prohibition should ap-
ply only to information certain to reach the market so quickly that
little or no time is available for handlers to make improper eco-
nomic decisions based upon existing prices.14 In Laidlaw, for ex-
ample, the end of the war would have quickly commanded the
attention of traders or handlers. In such cases, the costs of rushing
to make an additional speculative trade might outweigh the bene-
fits of giving better pricing signals for that short period of time.
On the other hand, as Professor Grossman noted, the tendency of
speculative trades to serve as pricing signals is an externality of
such trades.144 Services that confer external benefits may be un-
derproduced if they are not rewarded sufficiently Therefore, a
speculator who follows the development of peace negotiations and
brings that information to the market should be entitled to some
profit from the knowledge that the peace treaty has been signed.
The market itself may have developed a sensible system to
reward speculative trading that also limits those rewards when
dramatic information is likely to reach the market very soon. Fu-
tures markets generally suspend trading if market prices change
by a predetermined amount in a particular day 145 Such suspen-
sions give the market a chance to ascertain and digest ultramater-
ial developments without entirely removing the speculative gain
from their early discovery
It is important to distinguish nondisclosure cases where the
principal efficiency advantage is the signalling effect of prices
from other extrinsic information cases where the efficiency advan-
tage, if one exists, lies elsewhere. Consider, for example, the series
of cases holding that purchasers of land have "no duty to disclose
knowledge that railroad or industrial developments, street im-
provements, or the like, are projected, or apparently even actually
under construction, near the land which they are buying. 1 46
SCHWAGER, A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE FUTURES MARKETS 23-32 (1984).
143. See Wonnell, Contract Law and the Austrian School of Economics, 54 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 507, 529 (1986) (suggesting that if the information will reach the market
very quickly, the encouragement of entrepreneurial skills resulting from allowing specula-
tion is of secondary importance).
144. See S. GROSSMAN, THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF PRICES 70, 87 (1989).
145. See J. SCHWAGER, supra note 142, at 713-29 (setting out maximum daily fluc-
tuations for several commodities).
146. Annotation, supra note 83, at 440 (citing Pratt Land & Improvement Co. v.
McClain, 135 Ala. 452, 456, 33 So. 185, 186 (1902) (improvements in a nearby city);
Furman v. Brown, 227 Mich. 629, 637-38, 199 N.W 703, 706 (1924) (development of the
city); Stuart v. Dorow, 216 Mich. 591, 593, 185 N.W 662, 663 (1921) (possible construc-
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Can this line of cases be justified by the signalling benefits of
market prices 9 It is not apparent that such a justification can be
made. Purchases, of this character will tend to raise the market
price of land in the surrounding area, sending a generally accurate
signal to sellers of land to ready additional land for sale. However,
a purely price-taking buyer147 would be misled into concluding
that purchasing in this area was now less attractive, because land
was more expensive, than it had been before. Although some buy-
ers might be led to inquire into the reason for the price increase,
and thereby discover the intended improvements, it is difficult to
defend nondisclosure on the basis of a buyer's actual acquisition of
knowledge.
If there is an efficiency justification for nondisclosure in this
line of cases, it is basically the same as the efficiency justification
for buyer nondisclosure of intrinsic information.14' A seller who is
unaware of the planned improvement in the area may be led to
make unwise use of the land in reliance on this erroneous view of
the facts. This argument is more persuasive to the extent that the
intended development will not be public knowledge in the immedi-
ate future. If the knowledge is to become public immediately, the
only real argument for nondisclosure is the rather humble argu-
ment made earlier that there is a need to tolerate human weak-
nesses in order to avoid jeopardizing the security of
transactions.149
C. Avoiding Opportunistic Use of Disclosed Information
Professor Saul Levmore has argued persuasively that the non-
disclosure problem has much in common with the law of eminent
domain or takings.' 50 One justification for eminent domain is the
tion of a "suburban village"); Burt v. Mason, 97 Mich. 127, 134, 56 N.W 365, 367 (1893)
(prospect of railroad construction); Whitted v. Fugay, 127 N.C. 68, 72, 37 S.E. 141, 143
(1900) (railroads and other business already completed in the area); Guaranty Safe De-
posit & Trust Co. v. Liebold, 207 Pa. 399, 405, 56 A. 951, 953 (1904) (location of a large
factory nearby)).
147. A price taking buyer is one whose behavior has such a negligible effect upon
price that the buyer acts as if price were independent of his or her buying decision. See J.
HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 332 (2d ed. 1980).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 63-87.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 29-62.
150. See Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Con-
tracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117, 141-44 (1982) ("Both abrogate principles that are basic to our
notions of fair dealing Both concepts, however, are more palatable when viewed in
their corrective roles").
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need to avoid opportunistic behavior by land owners who become
aware of government projects. 151 For example, if the government
intends to build a highway through a particular area it will incur
extensive costs in designing that highway and, perhaps, beginning
its construction. Landowners in the path of the highway will know
that they have a monopoly because, under these circumstances,
they can exploit the high cost of diverting the highway or causing
its cancellation by demanding exorbitant prices for their land. The
government can avoid this problem by taking the land and paying
a "just compensation" that does not include this opportunistic
premium.152
As Levmore observes, nondisclosure is an alternative means
of preventing such opportunism. A railroad, lacking the power of
private eminent domain, will attempt to purchase land needed for
construction without disclosing its plans to the land owners.153 In-
deed, Levmore goes so far as to contend that if the railroad does
not disclose its plans to its agent, the agent, if asked specifically
whether the land is being acquired for purposes of building a rail-
road, should be able to say that no such plans exist. 154 The theory
is that the land owner is only seeking information for an improper
strategic or monopolistic purpose and has no right to demand the
information. Levmore refers to his theory as "optimal
dishonesty ",55
This theory tests one's tolerance for efficiency's demands on
morality Affirmative lying may not be necessary; the railroad
could have its attorneys hire agents, who would purchase the land
151. See R. POSNER, supra note 24, at 49 (suggesting that eminent domain may be
necessary to prevent monopolies, which would otherwise lead to inefficient use of
resources).
152. See Levmore, supra note 150, at 141-42 (explaining that the "just compensa-
tion ignores the increase in the property's value that results from the government's pro-
ject"); see also United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 334 (1949) (concluding that the
federal government need not pay the fair market value of a tug boat required for war
efforts but may deduct from the price the increase in value attributable to the government's
activities in the war era market).
153. See Levmore, supra note 150, at 140 ("[N]ondisclosure will prevent free
riding and encourage the socially-beneficial quest for information.").
154. See id. However, it should be noted that Levmore believes that this approach
"creates unnecessary transaction costs and does not protect the buyer" from a seller who
inquires into the identity of the actual purchaser of the land. Id. Levmore also expresses a
preference for a private eminent domain concept over this optimal dishonesty where the
former is feasible. See id. at 159.
155. Id. at 140.
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on behalf of an undisclosed principal. 156 Levmore, however, may
well be correct in asserting that false answers which only neutral-
ize questions which should not be asked are not immoral. 57
Case law has rarely confronted the optimal dishonesty ques-
tion in the stark form of an unquestionable lie regarding the fun-
damental purpose in acquiring the land. However, many "nondis-
closure" cases raise the issue of whether there truly was no
disclosure, or whether the statements made tend toward affirma-
tive deceit.'5 8 The purpose that courts attribute to nondisclosure
will influence their decisions about when to characterize the am-
biguous statements of a party in such a manner as to remove the
case from the realm of nondisclosure. If nondisclosure were toler-
ated only out of the recognition that humans are frail and the
courts cannot reconsider all transactions, then any statement
might be sufficient to cast the case as one of affirmative fraud. 15'9
However, if nondisclosure in a particular setting promotes a posi-
tive good, the courts might demand clear proof of affirmative
fraud to remove the case from the nondisclosure category 160
Labor law provides an interesting study of a very different
approach to essentially the same phenomenon of strategic or op-
portunistic use of disclosed information. Once a plant is built, it is
quite costly to dismantle or move. The union can exploit this fixed
cost in much the same way that the landowner can exploit the
fixed cost of prior railroad investment and the resulting high cost
of changing the route of the railroad.
156. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 304 reporter's note at 523 (1958)
("[N]on-disclosure is not fatal where the third party is not wholly unwilling to deal with
the principal, but where the third party, if he knew who the principal was, would try to
exact more onerous terms from him.").
157. See Levmore, supra note 150, at 142 ("The owner who demands a high
price for his property is really the despicable character."). An interesting, if imperfect,
analogy may be drawn to asking someone whether they like one's new shoes and having
them falsely say that they look fine.
158. See, e.g., Heise v. Pilot Rock Lumber Co., 222 Or. 78, 91, 352 P.2d 1072, 1078
(1960) (holding that a partial and fragmentary disclosure accompanied by willful conceal-
ment of material and qualifying facts is not a true statement and is often as much a fraud
as an inaccurate presentation); Chandler v. Butler, 284 S.W.2d 388, 395 (Tex. App. 1955)
(the premise of information as to a material fact may be fraud when a vendor knows that
the purchaser is acting on the supposition that no such material fact exists).
159. See Chandler, 284 S.W.2d at 395 ("[A] nod or a wink or a shake of the head,
or a smile from the purchaser, might defeat the application of the principle that mere
reticence on the part of a purchaser does not in law amount to fraud.").
160. See Culton v. Asher, 149 Ky. 659, 149 S.W 946 (1912) (land buyer's state-
ment to seller that land was worth only $1.75 per acre was dismissed as opinion despite the
fact that it was evident that the land was worth much more).
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However, it is not in the union's interest to make wage de-
mands that result in the closure of the plant, just as it behooves
the landowner to avoid demanding a price that forces the railroad
to divert the line. Therefore, in order to take opportunistic advan-
tage of the employer's fixed cost investment, the union requires
accurate information about the level of wages that would cause
the firm to lose enough money to force it to close. Again, this is
analogous to the landowner's desire to obtain information on ex-
actly how costly it would be for the railroad to alter the path of its
tracks in the middle of its construction plans. The employer and
the railroad naturally would be disinclined to provide this
information.
In the case of labor'law, however, the employer must provide
this information. Generally, employers are required to disclose to
the union information relevant to the union's discharge of its func-
tion as bargaining representative. 16 1 Disclosure of the facts that
substantiate a position of inability to pay is required by the duty
to bargain in good faith.16 2
A labor law exception to the general rules of contractual non-
disclosure might be justified on the theory that efficiency is a poor
proxy for utility in this setting. 6 3 If workers derive greater margi-
nal utility from the additional dollars they make as a result of the
disclosure duty than managers or shareholders lose, there may be
reason to accept opportunistic use of the disclosed information.
However, this argument takes as its premise the view that
workers can obtain higher wages as a result of the duty to disclose
than they could otherwise. This is yet another area in which ex
post reasoning tends to obstruct long run ex ante policy 164 Once
161. See, e.g., NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956) ("Good-faith
bargaining necessarily requires that claims made by either bargainer should be honest
claims If such an argument is important enough to present in bargaining, it is
important enough to require some sort of proof of its accuracy."); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 71 (3d Cir. 1965) (rejecting employer's argument that classifications
of some employees need not be disclosed because the employer considered the information
confidential); R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 409-18 (1976) (if the employer is in possession of information that is neces-
sary or relevant to the union in discharging its function as bargaining representative, the
employer will normally be required to turn over that information upon request of the
union).
162. See Truitt, 351 U.S. at 153; R. GORMAN, supra note 161, at 409.
163. See Coleman, Efficiency. Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 509, 526-48 (1980) (arguing that since wealth is not intrinsically valuable, any valid
theory must also take utility into account).
164. Cf. Wonnell, supra note 143, at 535-42 (discussing the detrimental ex ante ef-
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the plant is built, the union can secure more money for the work-
ers if it has access to the information. However, ex ante, prospec-
tive employers will foresee this situation and be disinclined to con-
struct plants that allows the unions to take advantage of their
fixed cost investments.16 5
Still, there is no reason to believe the unions violate their fi-
duciary duty to represent their current work force fairly by de-
manding and making use of information on how difficult it would
be for the firm to remain profitable given particular wage struc-
tures. Current workers will benefit from the higher wages that
come from opportunism, and most of the workers who would oth-
erwise have had jobs at plants that are not built are not repre-
sented by the union at the present time. Ideally, workers would
agree at the time the plant is built that they would not later take
opportunistic advantage of the plant's fixed cost. Such contractual
promises, however, would likely be struck down as analogous to
"yellow dog" contracts and contrary to public policy 166
Professor Farnsworth has argued that it does not make sense
to impose the labor law concept of disclosure on ordinary bar-
gains.1 67 In fact, one of the least reliable claims made during ne-
gotiations is that a particular offer is the "lowest (or highest) we
can possibly go." This is often described as the regrettable but
inevitable disposition of negotiators to deceive, and there is some
degree of truth to this characterization.' However, this section
fects of attempts to address unconscionability problems in contractual settings).
165. See generally Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
947, 970-72 (1984) (discussing the savings to an employer of operating where the doctrine
of contract at will is recognized); Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Cri-
tique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1385 (1983) [hereinafter
Epstein, A Common Law] (noting that labor has greater leverage when a firm's resources
are fixed in place).
166. See Epstein, A Common Law, supra note 165, at 1370-75 (challenging the con-
tention that the nature of employees' freedom to contract is "illusory" because employers
have excessive leverage with which to force employees to compromise their rights); see also
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988) (forbidding contracts in
which workers agree not to join a labor union); J. GETMAN & B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELA-
TIONS: THE BASIC PROCESSES, LAW AND PRACTICE 225 (1988) (defining "yellow dog" con-
tracts as "pledges extracted from employees not to join unions.").
167. See Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 277-79 (1987) (distinguishing
the rationale for the labor law approach to disclosure from that of ordinary bargaining
contexts).
168. See R. FISHER & W URY. GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITH-
OUT GIVING IN 137-40 (1981) (discussing falsification of facts and other deceptive tactics
used during negotiations).
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has argued that an uncooperative attitude about the facts that de-
termine the worst offer one can possibly accept may also be a nec-
essary method of avoiding the opportunistic exploitation that has
such detrimental ex ante consequences.
Contract modification cases present the problem of one
party's ability to exploit opportunistically any information that the
other party is required to disclose. Given this problem, it is curi-
ous that some courts treat non-disclosure by the party who suc-
cumbs to a one-sided modification as a factor in favor of enforcing
the modified contract. For example, in United States ex rel. Crane
Co. v Progressive Enterprises, Inc.,169 the court upheld a modifi-
cation against a claim of economic duress. In this case, Progres-
sive's nondisclosure took the form of its acceptance of an increase
in a bid made by subcontractor Crane without protest and without
notifying Crane that it did not intend to pay the higher price. The
court noted that this situation is distinguished from those in which
notice or protest is given by the buyer; the seller is then charged
with knowing that a new contract has not been accepted and the
original agreement still exists. 170
The reasoning of Progressive Enterprises is problematic if
applied improperly 171 A party should not be required to reveal its
desperate position on pain of having waived its rights, for such a
revelation will enhance the opportunistic advantage of the other
party Moreover, the party with a substantial situational monopoly
can use the resulting economic power to ensure that the other
party does not make any formal protest or reservation of rights.
On the other hand, failure to disclose an intention not to
abide by the modified contract can be a source of inefficiency The
other party may detrimentally rely on the completion of the modi-
fied contract,172 and the probability of litigation costs increases. In
evaluating whether the justification for the modification is derived
from economic duress or a good faith response to changes in cir-
169. 418 F Supp. 662 (E.D. Va. 1976).
170. Id. at 664; see also Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 272
N.E.2d 533, 324 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1971) (party submitted to a modification explaining that it
was forced to accept the modification); Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 194
S.E.2d 521 (1973) (succumbing party expressly reserving the right to sue at acceptance).
171. 418 F Supp. at 664 ("If the buyer wishes not to accede to the increased de-
mand, the seller must be dealt with honestly to be able to consider other possibilities.").
172. See supra text accompanying note 32 (discussing the efficiencies gained from
the promise dimension of contractual transactions).
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cumstances, 7 s the presence or absence of protests is an appropri-
ate factor to be considered. Significantly, though, in the cases
where protests of helplessness were made, they were made ex post,
that is, as part of the decision to accept a specific offer for a modi-
fication. 7 4 Ex ante protests that would gratuitously increase the
duress that the other party could exert in defining the terms of its
modification offer should not be required.
The distinction between ex ante and ex post notice is an im-
portant feature of the nondisclosure problem. The next section ex-
plores the significance of that distinction in the context of the
foreseeability of damages caused by a breach of contract.
V FORESEEABILITY AND OTHER CONTRACTUAL DEFAULT
RULES
Under the rule made famous in Hadley v Baxendale, 75 con-
sequential damages are recoverable only if the breaching party
foresaw or should have foreseen such damages at the time the
contract was signed.' 76 The rule in Hadley has been defended as a
method of encouraging parties who are aware of the risks that
their contemplated use of resources entails to disclose those risks
to the other party '
This raises questions as to the relationship between the Had-
ley doctrine and cases of privileged nondisclosure. For example,
suppose that the buyer of land was aware, either through deliber-
ate effort'78 or casual discovery, that the seller's land contained
valuable minerals. Alternatively, suppose that the buyer was
aware of the existence of another individual who would be willing
to buy the land in question for a higher price than was paid. In
these cases, if the parties enter into a contract without any ad-
173. See Aivazian, Trebilcock, & Penny, The Law of Contract Modifications: The
Uncertain Quest for a Bench Mark of Enforceability, 22 OsGooDE HALL L.J. 173 (1984)
(surveying the law of duress as it relates to the enforcement of contract modifications).
174. See, e.g., Rose, 282 N.C. at 650, 665, 194 S.E.2d at 526, 536 (the buyer noti-
fied the seller, who modified their contract while continuing to purchase goods thereunder,
of intent to sue).
175. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
176. Id. at 346, 156 Eng. Rep. at 147-48.
177. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 101 (1989) (the rule is a "purposeful induce-
ment" to the more informed party to reveal information).
178. The problem that Hadley might pose in cases of deliberately acquired informa-
tion is noted in Ayres & Gertner, supra note 177, at 107, and R. PosNER, supra note 24, at
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vanced disclosure, and the seller subsequently breaches that con-
tract, what damages should the buyer be able to recover 9 Specifi-
cally, should damages include the lost value from the buyer's
contemplated use or resale of the land, or should such damages be
barred by the Hadley doctrine as unforeseeable special damages9
Although the law in this area has not been consistent, it has
found considerable use for the Hadley doctrine in cases of buyer
nondisclosure.7 9 With respect to real estate transactions, for ex-
ample, the courts have been reluctant to make adequate damage
remedies available to buyers. While buyers of land are generally
entitled to specific performance, s0 many states have limited dam-
ages for buyers to a restitutionary return of the purchase price.' 8'
Even courts that allow buyers an "expectation" measure of dam-
ages often refuse to allow the buyer to recover the lost profits from
either the contemplated resale or the contemplated use of the
land.' The Hadley foreseeability requirement is often cited in
these cases denying recovery,'83 although the real estate case law
is not uniform in this respect. 8 4
The courts have been more willing to allow consequential
damages to a buyer who claims to have lost the profits of a con-
templated resale of goods when the original seller has breached by
failing to deliver.'8 5 It is generally held that the Hadley test is
179. See Annotation, Vendor and Purchaser: Recovery for Loss of Profits from Con-
templated Sale or Use of Land, Where Vendor Fails or Refuses to Convey, 11 A.L.R.3d
719, 722-23 (1967) (the Hadley doctrine is the general rule applied to prohibit the buyer
from offering the privately contemplated use as part of the damage award).
180. See, e.g., Forman v. Benson, 112 11. App. 3d 1070, 1078, 446 N.E.2d 535, 541
(1983) (lower court did not exceed its authority in granting the purchaser specific perform-
ance); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 comment e (1979) (specific perform-
ance traditionally awarded to buyers or sellers of real estate).
181. See R. CUNNINGHAM, W STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN. THE LAW OF PROPERTY
642-43 (student ed. 1984) (recovery is generally limited to payments made plus incidential
expenses); 8A J. GRIMES, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 4478 (1963).
182. See, e.g., Susi v. Simonds, 147 Me. 189, 85 A.2d 178 (1951) (specific damages
inappropriate where the defendant had no knowledge of the purchaser's intended use);
Merritt v. Adams County Land & Inv. Co., 29 N.D. 496, 151 N.W 11 (1915) (disallow-
ing specific damages where the contemplated use of the land was known only by the
buyer).
183. See Sust, 85 A.2d at 179, 147 Me. at 190; Merritt, 29 N.D. at 506, 151 N.W
at 14.
184. Some cases have allowed recovery where the vendor was informed or should
have known of the buyer's intent to resell the land. See, e.g., Caughey v. Ames, 315 Mich.
643, 24 N.W.2d 521 (1946).
185. Out of 200 cases decided from 1946 to 1955, plaintiffs recovered lost profits in
75% of the cases where resale was involved and in 50% of the manufacturing use cases.
Comment, Lost Profits as Contract Damages: Problems of Proof and Limitations on Re-
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satisfied if the seller had reason to know that the buyer might
intend to resell, even if the seller had no specific information
about the resale sufficient to enable a calculation of the probable
consequential damages."' 6 Recovery of lost profits from a contem-
plated use of the goods has been allowed over a challenge based
on Hadley 187 Still, there are cases denying recovery of "contem-
plated use" damages due to lack of foreseeability 188 Given the
confused state of the case law in both the sales and real estate
areas, it is important to explore the normative case for applying
the Hadley requirement of ex ante disclosure of consequential
damages to buyer nondisclosure cases.
In such cases, nondisclosure by buyers is an affirmatively
good thing. A requirement that the buyer of land disclose the exis-
tence of minerals or the existence of a sub-purchaser who values
the land more would be self-defeating. Since the buyer would
know that such disclosure would destroy the prospects of acquir-
ing the land, a rule requiring disclosure could cause such a buyer
to refrain from trading, and the land would not be moved to its
highest use.1a9 Yet if the Hadley doctrine were applied, the seller
would not be liable for damages due to the loss of these contem-
plated uses for the land because of the buyer's nondisclosure. The
seller would have an incentive to breach the contract upon discov-
covery, 65 YALE L.J. 992, 1016 n.137 (1956).
186. See Sun Maid Raisin Growers v. Victor Packing Co., 146 Cal. App. 3d 787,
793, 194 Cal. Rptr. 612, 616 (1983) ("[A]ppellants had reason to know that their failure
to deliver the 610 tons [of raisins] would result in lost profits on resales by Sun
Maid."); Harbor Hill Lithographing Corp. v. Dittler Bros., 76 Misc. 2d 145, 147, 348
N.Y.S.2d 920, 923 (1973) ("[W]hile there was no evidence that [the seller] knew the
precise extent [of the buyer's] contemplated profits the possibility, if not the
probability, of anticipating profit from resale was reasonably within the contemplation of
the parties.").
187. See Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500, 510-11 (8th Cir. 1971) (a seller
providing goods to a manufacturer is assumed to know that a disruption of production will
cause lost profits and that the manufacturer will be allowed to recover those lost profits); J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 397 (2d ed. 1980) ("The trend of
Code cases to date strongly suggests that the courts will construe this foreseeability re-
quirement [of U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (1989)] to the plaintiff's benefit.").
188. See English Whipple Sailyard, Ltd. v. The Yawl Ardent, 459 F Supp. 866, 877
(W.D. Pa. 1978) (finding that damages for the plaintiff's contemplated use of the boat
were too speculative because the defendant had no reason to know of this contemplated
use); Gerwin v. Southeastern Cal. Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 14 Cal. App. 3d 209,
92 Cal. Rptr. I II (1971) (refusing to award damages for anticipated profits where the
defendant did not know the contracting party's identity, because the profits were specula-
tive, and the defendant had no reason to foresee the damages).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 63-87.
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ering a purchaser who would pay more than the contract price
(plus incidental damages), preventing the land from reaching the
higher use contemplated by the original buyer.
However, if the buyer does not disclose the intended use, the
seller will not realize that the breach would generate substantial
damages. It is almost axiomatic that a given buyer will not incur
substantial unforeseeable damages. The seller will not know to
take measures ensuring the ability to perform the contract. More-
over, the seller may breach the contract when a new buyer comes
along, and a large money damage award for the original buyer
will simply be absorbed by the seller. Litigation costs will con-
sume the contractual surpluses, but the land still fails to achieve
its highest and best use.
Evaluating these two arguments requires an inquiry into the
economic rationale underlying the Hadley doctrine. Why is it de-
sirable to encourage the party who will face special consequential
damages from a breach to disclose that information 9 If Baxendale
had known how urgently Hadley needed the crank shaft, what dif-
ference would it have made in Baxendale's behavior? One possi-
bility is that Baxendale might have raised his price in response to
the disclosed risk, perhaps inspiring Hadley not to use Baxendale's
service but to find a more reliable means of getting the factory
back in operation. Furthermore, even if Hadley were willing to
pay the higher price, the additional disclosure would give Bax-
endale an incentive to be especially careful not to breach this par-
ticular contract.19 0 Baxendale would know not to breach this con-
tract deliberately (barring extraordinary alternative opportunities)
and would also know to devote resources toward avoiding careless
or negligent breaches of the contract.
For present purposes, it is important to separate these two
responses to the disclosure of consequential damages. The first re-
sponse suggests that a Hadley-Baxendale transaction might sim-
ply be an inefficient use of Baxendale's resources, a fact revealed
to Hadley by Baxendale's high price. The second response sug-
gests that Baxendale might commit an inefficient breach of con-
tract without the information - either a deliberate breach or a
deliberate failure to exercise sufficient care to protect against a
negligent inability to perform. These two consequences of nondis-
190. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 177, at 104 ("Hadley penalizes high-damage
millers for withholding information that would allow carriers to take efficient
precautions.").
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closure can be called the "inefficient transaction" and "inefficient
brach" problems.191
Separating these two problems suggests an important point
relating to the timing of disclosure. If the transaction itself would
be inefficient, disclosure must occur ex ante, before the parties are
locked into a contractual relationship. However, if the problem is
inefficient breach, it is theoretically necessary only that disclosure
occur before the decision is made that leads to the breach.192 If
the breach is deliberate, the disclosure must occur prior to the
breach; if the breach consists of a negligent failure to perform, the
disclosure must occur before the degree of care decision is made.
Recall the case of nondisclosure by a buyer where the seller's
land contains valuable minerals. Section III argued that this
transaction is indeed efficient, moving the resource and the infor-
mation together.1 93 The seller would like to know this information
for two reasons. First, knowing the information itself increases the
value of the land and, in turn, increases its price. Second, knowing
the information informs the seller that the buyer would suffer sub-
stantial damages from a breach of contract by the seller. The
prospect of additional damages would in turn lead the seller to
raise the price as well as devote additional care to prevent
breaches of the contract. These two reasons for the seller to want
the information will be referred to as the "strategic reason" and
the "damage notice reason."
The privilege of nondisclosure is designed to prevent the seller
from strategically appropriating the buyer's information. By con-
trast, the damage notice reason is a legitimate purpose for the
seller to seek disclosure - it is the same reason that Baxendale
sought notice of Hadley's consequential damages, despite the fact
that such knowledge conferred no immediate strategic gain for
191. "Efficient breach" is often thought of as a subset of deliberate or willful breach,
but this is not always the case. It may be efficient to devote a limited amount of resources
toward ensuring that one will be able to perform, recognizing that in some cases perform-
ance will be unfeasible because insufficient resources were expended. For example, it might
not have been efficient for Baxendale to use the most reliable employee in the company to
carry the crank shaft. See generally Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the
Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947, 951-52 (1982) (defining "efficient breach" and arguing that it is
rarely applicable).
192. In some cases, these two ideas will converge. For example, some care decisions
are made at the time of contracting, such as what routes will be taken by the carrier. In
such instances, failure to give ex ante disclosure would be inefficient, unless full disclosure
would produce still larger offsetting inefficiencies.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
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Baxendale. The issue to be explored is whether a failure to give ex
ante notice in the mineral case will lead either to inefficient trans-
actions or to inefficient breaches.
There is no reason to believe that a failure to give" ex ante
notice in a mineral case will lead to inefficient transactions. Dis-
closure would have led the seller to raise the price because of
higher consequential damages manifested through disclosure, even
if the seller had not taken strategic advantage of the buyer's dis-
closure. However, since most contracts are performed, a dramatic
price increase is not required. An increase large enough to cover
the expected consequential damages multiplied by the probability
of breach is sufficient.194 Since the consequential damages protect
a gain to the buyer, the buyer would be willing to pay this small
increase in price to secure the full consequential gain. In short,
because the buyer remains willing to purchase the land despite the
increase in price brought about by notice of consequential dam-
ages, the transaction itself is efficient. 195 Of course, one cannot
test this theory by requiring actual ex ante disclosure, for then the
seller could raise the price dramatically for strategic rather than
damage notice reasons.
The question remains whether a failure to disclose the exis-
tence of minerals on the land would lead to inefficient breaches,
since the seller had no way of knowing how badly the buyer
needed the property at the time the seller made its care or breach
decisions. There are two points to be made about this rationale for
applying the Hadley doctrine to the mineral case.
First, one must be careful in asserting that a particular
breach of contract is in fact efficient. For example, Posner has
viewed an efficient breach as occurring when the seller realizes a
greater return by accepting a higher bid than the original buyer
had contracted to pay, even after compensating the original buyer
for the breach. 9 8 This is an unusual circumstance because the
second buyer could simply purchase the property from the original
buyer. 97 If the seller is only tempted to breach for this reason,
194. Cf. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1932) (to determine the
duty owed in a negligence action, the burden which the defendant would have to assume to
avoid the harm must be less than the gravity of the potential injury multiplied by the
probability that the harm will occur).
195. "Efficiency" is used here in a Kaldor-Hicks sense. For a discussion of Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency, see supra note 41.
196. See R. POSNER, supra note 24, at 107-08.
197. See Macneil, supra note 191, at 951-52 (analyzing efficiencies of breach under
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there is no efficiency gain to be protected. Since refusing recovery
of unforeseeable consequential damages will not deter breach as
effectively as high damages, it would be a step in the wrong direc-
tion to apply the Hadley doctrine on the theory that nondisclosure
misled the seller into thinking that this was a case of efficient
breach. Indeed, if there is no possibility for a truly efficient
breach, specific performance or punitive damages sufficient to de-
ter breaches should be awarded.
The second point is that even if a seller reasonably believes,
because of the nondisclosure, that an efficient breach is possible,
the problem can be remedied by ex post rather than ex ante dis-
closure.1 98 The seller must know that the buyer will incur substan-
tial consequential damages but only needs to acquire this informa-
tion at some time prior to the breach or to making a care decision
increasing the likelihood of an unintentional breach. However, the
seller does not require ex ante disclosure and should not be enti-
tled to receive it due to the likelihood for strategic misappropria-
tion of any ex ante disclosure.
The purpose of the Hadley doctrine, which disallows uncom-
municated consequential damages, is to encourage ex ante com-
munication. On the facts of Hadley, ex ante communication is
necessary to prevent inefficient transactions, while ex post commu-
nication is sufficient to prevent inefficient breaches. In the mineral
case, the transactions themselves are efficient, and thus there is no
need for ex ante communication. Moreover, the problem of strate-
gic use of the information counsels against an ex ante disclosure
requirement. If the seller could reasonably believe that an efficient
breach is possible, because of the nondisclosure, a requirement of
ex post disclosure as a condition for the recovery of consequential
damages would be appropriate. If there is no possibility of efficient
breach, damages should not be limited by any foreseeability doc-
trine, but should be augmented sufficiently to deter breaches of
contract.
Another rule of sales law clarifies the argument regarding the
differential utility of ex ante disclosures in various settings. Unless
expectation damages and specific performance). "Unusual circumstances" might include
situations where sub-buyers could not deal with the original buyer as cheaply as they could
with the seller.
198. See Sanderlin v. Willis, 94 Ga. 171, 21 S.E. 291 (1894) (suggesting ex post
notice of a breach of contract would rebut a general demurrer and would entitle the party
to recover damages).
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expressly disclaimed, a seller of goods often warrants that the
goods are fit for the particular purpose to which the buyer intends
to put them.1 99 However, such a warranty does not apply unless
the seller had ex ante reason to know the particular purpose for
the contract. 00
For example, in Johnson v Lappo Lumber Co.,2°  plaintiff
was a hog farmer who purchased a fan to provide additional air
circulation for the hogs in a barn. The fan failed to provide ade-
quate ventilation, causing the death of a large number of hogs and
causing the plaintiff to incur considerable veterinary expenses to
save the remainder. 0 2 Nevertheless, the court held that the seller
had not breached the implied warranty of fitness for particular
purposes because the buyer had not explained to the seller the
conditions in the barn which necessitated a different type of
fan.2 0 3
The high consequential damages incurred in Johnson demon-
strate that the plaintiff's use of the fan may have been a social
waste; the fan should have been used for a more prosaic purpose
in which it would have accomplished some positive end. Similarly,
in Hadley, the high consequential damages suggest that there may
have been too much risk to justify using Baxendale's services on
behalf of Hadley's mill. The high prices that would have followed
ex ante disclosures by the buyers of their particular needs might
have led the buyers to forego these particular services, reflecting
the private cost-benefit judgments needed to ensure the social util-
ity of transactions. To summarize, the amount of consequential
damages in these two cases point to the possibility that the re-
sources in question (Baxendale's carrier service and the farmer's
fan) were actually less socially valuable in their contractual usage
199. See U.C.C. § 2-315 (1989) ("[W]here the seller at the time of contracting has
reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required [t]here is
unless excluded or modified an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose.").
200. See Abraham v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 795 F.2d 238, 249 (2d Cir. 1986)
(an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises where the seller knows or has
reason to know the particular purpose for which the buyer requires the goods); Price Bros.
v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 649 F.2d 416, 423 (6th Cir. 1981) (an implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose is contingent on the seller's awareness of the particular
purpose at the time of the contract).
201. 25 Mich. App. 217, 181 N.W.2d 316 (1970).
202. Id. at 219, 181 N.W.2d at 317-18.
203. Id. at 223-24, 181 N.W.2d at 320.
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than they would have been in alternative uses.204
In general, the same analysis applies to the case of a buyer
who does not disclose a resale opportunity 205 A requirement of ex
ante disclosure would allow the seller to deal directly with the
sub-buyer, a possibility which would tend to deter the original
buyer from acting on knowledge of the resale opportunity Fur-
thermore, if Hadley is held to bar consequential damages result-
ing from the loss of a resale opportunity when there has been no
ex ante communication, the seller would have insufficient incentive
to refrain from inefficient breaches.
The rule of Hadley v Baxendale is a default rule. Subject to
constraints such as unconscionability and the penalty rule of liqui-
dated damages, 206 parties can contract around it by agreeing to be
liable for special damages. 0 7 Professors Ayres and Gertner have
used the Hadley case as an example when discussing default rules
in contract law 208 They argue that default rules should not neces-
sarily be set where contracting parties would want them. Rather,
they suggest that in some cases it would be appropriate to set less
accommodating default rules as an incentive for one party to come
forward with important information in order to avoid the opera-
tion of the unfavorable rule. 0
The thesis of this. article suggests that there may be a range
over which a reverse Ayres and Gertner rule would be appropri-
204. By contrast, the mineral cases do not represent a situation in which the transac-
tion itself is inefficient. See supra text accompanying note 179.
205. On the other hand, there will be situations in which it appears substantially
certain that the seller would have discovered the higher price opportunity independently if
the buyer had not arrived to place a bid first. For example, in Chandler v. Butler, 284
S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), a purchaser came to the house of an elderly doctor and
offered him a price for the latter's stock that was only two-thirds of the price for which the
stock was then trading on the over-the-counter market. Id. at 390-94. The court held that
the purchaser had committed fraud. Id. at 398. It is difficult to justify such a transaction
on efficiency or fairness grounds.
206. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14.5 (3d ed. 1987);
Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L. REv. 495, 499-513
(1962) (discussing the penalty rule of liquidated damages).
207. See generally E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 29, § 12.18 (discussing principles
and limits of agreed remedies).
208. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 177, at 101-04 (characterizing the Hadley rule as
a "penalty default" because the denial of consequential damages penalized the miller for
withholding important information that could have prompted the carrier to act more
efficiently).
209. See id. at 103-04 ("When relatively informed parties strategically withhold in-
formation, courts, to promote information revelation, sliould choose a default [sic] that the
informed party does not want.").
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ate; that is, a default rule established for the purpose of encourag-
ing nondisclosure in cases where such nondisclosure brings affirm-
ative efficiency gains. Whether this objective requires default rules
that parties themselves would not choose is an important question
to be considered later.210 Consider default rules pertaining to the
assignment of contracts. As an example, suppose that A has ac-
quired an option to purchase O's land. Should A be able to assign
the right to exercise the option to B9 The contract might provide
either that assignment of the option was permissible or impermis-
sible, but in many cases assignability will not be expressly ad-
dressed, necessitating a default rule. In general, assignment of
contracts is permitted in cases where the parties are silent on the
question.211 The major limitation on such assignability arises when
the assignment of rights and/or delegation of duties would be
prejudicial to the opposing party 212 For example, B could not ex-
ercise the option solely by giving a note in payment without A's
credit standing behind B's promise. Where prejudice of this na-
ture is not involved, as when B is willing to pay cash to exercise
the option, the law favors assignability 213
Significantly, it is generally not a defense that A negotiated
the option with the intention to assign the option to B. One possi-
ble exception could be that an assignment to a person with whom
A knew 0 was not willing to deal on any terms is improper. 214
Delegation of contractual duties is permissible unless the duties
210. See infra text accompanying notes 218-37.
211. See, e.g., Smithfield Oil Co. v. Furlonge, 257 N.C. 388, 393, 126 S.E.2d 167,
171 (1962) (rights are not dependent on the use of "assign" in the contract but exist abso-
lutely in the absence of contractual or statutory prohibitions).
212. See Macke Co. v. Pizza of Gaithersburg, Inc., 259 Md. 479, 482, 270 A.2d 645,
646 (1970) in which the court stated:
In the absence of a contrary provision - and there was none here - rights and
duties under an executory bilateral contract may be assigned and delegated, sub-
ject to the exception that duties under a contract to provide personal services
may never be delegated, nor rights be assigned under a contract where delectus
personae was an ingredient of the bargain.
213. See Cochran v. Taylor, 273 N.Y 172, 7 N.E.2d 89 (1937) (right of holder of
sealed option to purchase property for cash or for 20 percent cash plus note was assignable
where assignee tendered the cash).
214. Cf. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 29, § 11.10 n.26 (if one party makes a contract
with the undisclosed intention of delegating performance to a person distasteful to the
other party, the other party may have a claim of fraud). But see H. REUSCHLEIN & W.
GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 179 (2d ed. 1990) ("It is generally
recognized that one may quite properly contract with another with full intention to assign
the contract to one with whom it is known the other would not contract.").
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are clearly of a personal nature;215 the mere fact that the party
entering into the contract intended to delegate the duties, with the
original delegator remaining liable on the promise, is not a reason
to oppose delegation.
These default rules favoring free assignability promote the ef-
ficiency gains of nondisclosure. If A knows of someone who is
more interested in the contractual rights or more capable of per-
forming the contractual duties, disclosure of these facts is not nec-
essary Disclosure would merely cause the owner to deal directly
with the other person, and the prospect of such a response would
deter the use of this information by the original party
An interesting question is whether the default rule of free as-
signment and delegation, subject only to the constraint against
prejudicial assignments, comports with the rule that the parties
would have chosen had they addressed the question. 0 presumably
has some reason for choosing to deal with A, so that compulsory
contractual relations with a person that 0 did not directly deal
with almost inevitably involves some cost. Moreover, A's decision
to contract and then assign or delegate to B may preclude 0 from
obtaining profits that 0 might otherwise have received. These ar-
guments suggest that the law imposes an undesirable default rule
upon 0
On the other hand, it may be that the default rule encourages
competition among those who believe that they know potential
sub-parties who value the contractual rights more highly (or who
disvalue the contractual duties less). The competitive bidding that
results can convert the Kaldor-Hicks efficiencies from nondisclo-
sure into a mutually beneficial exchange. If so, 0 might choose a
default rule that permits nondisclosure of intent to assign as a
means of increasing interest in the property This tendency of
competition to convert Kaldor-Hicks efficiencies of nondisclosure
into mutual benefits is discussed more fully in the next section.216
215. See British Wagon Co. v. Lea & Co., 5 Q.B.D. 149 (1880) (assignment of
contractual obligations was permitted because personal performance was not the essence of
the contract); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 318 illustrations 2 and 3 (1979)
(examples of instances when delegation and performance of duty is binding).
216. See infra text accompanying notes 220-37.
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VI. TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY
A. Mutual Benefit, Disclaimability, and Commercial Custom
Briefly summarizing conclusions regarding the efficiency im-
plications of contractual nondisclosure, this article began with a
paradigm that explains many of the factors courts have considered
in nondisclosure cases. This paradigm involved the trade-off be-
tween exchange-based and promise-based policies in contract
law 217 Four additional factors were then added to the calculus,
factors which primarily affected buyer nondisclosure and the non-
disclosure of extrinsic facts. These factors were the efficiency
gains from merging information and resources, internalizing the
external benefits of entrepreneurial activities, providing advanced
pricing signals of impending changes in supply or demand, and
avoiding the opportunistic or extortionate use of disclosed
information.218
It is important to explore the relationship between these four
efficiency factors and the idea of mutual benefit central to con-
tract law All of the efficiency factors point to net wealth gains in
a Kaldor-Hicks sense, but such wealth gains might derive from a
benefit to one contracting party that exceeds the other party's loss.
This contradicts the ordinary assumption that contracts yield
transactions that enrich both contracting parties (although non-
parties, such as competitors of the parties, may lose, Pareto effi-
ciency has never been a realistic ideal of contract law) .219
Closely related to the question of mutual benefit is the issue
of disclaimability The rules identified for determining whether to
permit nondisclosure may arguably be seen as gap-filling rules
that the parties should be able to alter by agreement.220 Should
these nondisclosure rules yield efficiencies at the expense of one
party, that party would have an incentive to defeat these social
efficiencies by opting out of the background rules on
nondisclosure.
Suppose, for example, that one becomes aware that a railroad
217. See supra text accompanying notes 29-61.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 74-175.
219. See Wonnell, supra note 143, at 511-12 (noting that economists since Adam
Smith have assumed that contracts will be mutually beneficial to the contracting parties
while potentially harming their competitors).
220. Kronman argues that the distinction between deliberate and casual acquisition
of information is merely a gap-filling rule to be applied in the absence of an express alloca-
tion of risk. See Kronman, supra note 62, at 114-17.
1991]
C4SE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
will come to a particular town in eight months and purchases land
from a landowner in the town who is unaware of this information.
If the landowner would not discover the railroad's plans immedi-
ately, efficiency gains might arise from the purchaser using the
land in a manner consistent with the arrival of the new railroad
and from preventing the previous owner from making irrevocable
decisions about the land which would be inconsistent with the
planned railroad. The question, however, is whether these social
benefits are obtained at the expense of the existing landowner.221
In cases of this type, sellers almost always inquire into the
reason for the purchaser's interest in the property Purchasers typ-
ically respond with uninformative answers that sellers later argue
constitute affirmative fraud justifying avoidance of these transac-
tions.222 However, the sellers generally have failed to negotiate a
clause stating that the purchaser warrants the absence of material
favorable information. Presumably purchasers are unwilling to
give such warranties, and sellers who insist upon them do not
complete transactions that end in litigation.
Why might a seller fail to insist upon warranties of this char-
acter 9 The seller could lose the opportunity to enter into a con-
tract with a particular buyer, but the seller would know that this
buyer possesses material information. With respect to information,
such as the plan for the railroad, that the seller would eventually
acquire, a transaction with that particular buyer could become a
source of regret.
Conversely, the seller may benefit from taking a passive
stance that does not insist on a warranty that no material infor-
mation motivates a purchaser. If one person is aware of particular
information, others may also be aware, and the seller could benefit
from encouraging competitive bidding for the property Alterna-
tively, the first individual may well make a bid that is sufficiently
lucrative to preempt foreseeable competitors and the seller will not
want to lose that bid by insisting on a warranty
The actual or preempted competitive bidding would have a
tendency to convert Kaldor-Hicks efficient transactions into mutu-
221. Professor Wang argues that a difficult empirical calculation involving the bene-
fit to the landowner of efficient use of the land is required to conclude that nondisclosure is
in the long-run interest of all the groups of people affected by such rules. See Wang, Re-
flections on Contract Law and Distributive Justice: A Reply to Kronman, 34 HASTINGS
L.J. 513, 525 (1982).
222. For example, the seller made such an inquiry in Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2
Wheat.) 178, 183 (1817).
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ally beneficial transactions. Prices would tend to rise to the point
where the seller would be better off selling than holding on to the
land and risk making erroneous decisions about its use. Of course,
the market price may subsequently rise above the contract price,
giving the seller reason to seek rescission of the contract. It does
not follow, however, that it was irrational for the seller to enter
into the transaction ex ante when there might have been a greater
interest in immediate liquidity
It is not contended that all Kaldor-Hicks efficient nondisclo-
sure transactions are also mutually beneficial. If one individual is
in sole possession of particular information and is aware of this
fact, no competitive bidding will be anticipated or will occur. This
situation presents the normative question of whether to tolerate
the private loss in the interest of the net social benefit, or Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency 223 Unless the losers are placed in a position
where Rawlsian concerns about the least advantaged are trig-
gered, there is no apparent reason to treat these losses differently
than the private losses that one competitor suffers when another
competitor devises a more socially useful product.224
However, the tendency of competitive bidding to transform
Kaldor-Hicks gains from nondisclosure into mutually beneficial
transactions explains the failure of the nondisclosure problem to
self-liquidate.225 Standard form contracts for the sale of land do
not contain clauses in which the purchaser renounces possession of
material information. Moreover, there has been an evolution of
institutions, such as futures markets, that facilitate speculative
trading on the basis of superior information.226
223. Compare Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472,
478-87 (1980) (short term gain at the expense of a few is tolerable if the transaction is
ultimately to the benefit of all) with Wang, supra note 221, at 524-25 (criticizing
Kronman's approach because of the difficulty in identifying the individual victims, their
losses, and the ultimate gain).
224. Rawls's concern is not with individual transactions but with the basic structure
of society and the impact of its principal institutions upon particular groups. These institu-
tions define the rights and duties of members of society as well as their future prospects. By
virtue of the nature of this relationship, certain "starting positions" are more advantageous
than others, leading to "deep inequalities." Rawls's concept of justice focuses on "how
fundamental rights and duties are assigned and on the economic opportunities and social
conditions in the various sectors of society." See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 7-11
(1971).
225. It has been argued, for example, that investors are paid a premium to compen-
sate them for the known possibility of insider trading. See Scott, Insider Trading: Rule
lOb-5. Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 807-09 (1980).
226. Such institutions would promote speculative trading through trading rules as
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There will often be settings in which one party feels disad-
vantaged if the other party trades on the basis of inside informa-
tion.2217 The prohibition of nondisclosure by parties who have un-
dertaken the duties of a fiduciary can be understood in this
context. Indeed, the nondisclosure considerations can be useful in
determining when it is appropriate to recognize a particular rela-
tionship as fiduciary in character. Fiduciary ties are held to arise
out of relations of trust and confidence.228 Transactions with a fi-
duciary require disclosure because the principal trusts the fiduci-
ary and thus is not apt to exercise the same caution and diligence
required by an arm's length transaction.2 9 This observation fits
easily into the exchange-promise framework developed earlier,
with its emphasis on the extent to which a particular nondisclo-
sure was discoverable by the other party One of the efficiencies of
dealing with a fiduciary is that it spares the expense of staying
well as the abstract nature of transactions comprised solely of risk transfer, the purchaser
having no intention to take physical possession of a commodity. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 120-36.
227. Professor Wang argues that as a result of the "law of conservation of securi-
ties," there will always be monetary losers from insider trading. See Wang, Trading on
Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and
Who Can Sue Under SEC Rule lob-5, 54 S. CAL L. REV. 1217, 1234-35 (1981). However,
while buyers' gains must equal sellers' losses, investors who neither bought nor sold can
benefit from the external effects of these trades. See Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis
of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 13 n.62
("[I]nsider trading may reduce the time it takes for a stock price to reflect relevant infor-
mation benefiting all market participants."). Finally, a zero-sum monetary game does not
translate into a zero-sum utility game given the varying attitudes of investors toward risks
and the varying effects of losses on different portfolios.
228. The fiduciary concept has been extended to include commercial franchises. E.g.,
Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 882 (8th Cir. 1979) (reasoning that as a result
of building up the goodwill of her own business as well as that of the franchisor, the fran-
chisee stands in a fiduciary relationship with the latter), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980).
Also, a bank's relationship with its borrowers has been held to be of a fiduciary nature.
See, e.g., Barrett v. Bank of Am., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 1369, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16, 20-21
(1986) (holding that the relationship of trust and confidence between a bank and its loan
customers is quasi-fiduciary).
229. See, e.g., Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486-87 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
("[H]older[s] of closely held stock in a corporation bear a fiduciary duty to deal
openly with their fellow stockholders and to make disclosure of all essential information.");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390 (1958) (an agent acting as an adverse party
has a duty to deal fairly with the principal); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 173
(1979) (a contract between a fiduciary and a beneficiary is voidable if one party is unaware
of all relevant facts and legal rights); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(2) (1959)
(a trustee dealing on his or her own behalf with the beneficiary has a duty to disclose all
material facts to the beneficiary).
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alert to all of the relevant facts. 30
However, this article has suggested reasons beyond the ex-
change-promise dichotomy for recognizing a category of fiduciary
relationships and especially for setting a limit on that concept.
Contracts will be made for fiduciary responsibilities by parties un-
til the costs of full disclosure to the fiduciary exceed the benefits
of receiving all the relevant information. 3 1 Costs of disclosure will
tend to exceed these benefits where the relationship offers opportu-
nities tod appropriate the social efficiencies of nondisclosure. Even
if those transactions, considered individually, conferred a $1000
benefit on one party at the expense of a $500 loss to the other, the
losing party would have an incentive to make those transactions a
part of the compensation package of the benefiting party Re-
moval of the fiduciary relationship would allow an arrangement of
the transactions that creates mutual benefit out of transactions
that, individually, were only Kaldor-Hicks efficient.
Beyond the narrow realm of fiduciary relationships, the law
of nondisclosure often refers to the customary morality of the
commercial community 232 For example, the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts requires one to disclose information "basic to the
transaction, if he knows that the other is about to enter into it
under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the
relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other ob-
jective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of
those facts. 233
"Reasonable expectations" is always a slippery concept, espe-
cially since the expectations of commercial parties are often a
230. See Levmore, supra note 150, at 135 (noting the problem that effort is wasted
learning information for one's own protection that someone else already possesses).
231. See Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting
that, to a certain extent, parties may define their obligation to disclose information), cert.
dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988).
232. Consider, for example, the following:
The continuing development of modern business ethics has, however, limited to
some extent this privilege to take advantage of ignorance It is extremely
difficult to be specific as to the factors that give rise to this known, and reasona-
ble, expectation of disclosure. In general, the cases in which the rule stated in
Clause (e) has been applied have been those in which the advantage taken of the
plaintiff's ignorance is so shocking to the ethical sense of the community, and is
so extreme and unfair, as to amount to a form of swindling, in which the plain-
tiff is led by appearances into a bargain that is a trap, of whose essence and
substance he is unaware.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 comment 1 (1977).
233. Id. § 551(2)(e).
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function of the governing legal rules. It is tempting to conclude
that the "reasonable expectation" is the expectation that is in ac-
cordance with the better ethical view of a particular practice .1 4
Such a conclusion, however, would miss the epistemological gain
from deducing what pre-legal morality had actually evolved to
govern particular types of transactions. The general acceptance of
nondisclosure in a particular setting may be due to the presence of
one or more efficiencies.235 Regarding nondisclosure as unethical
in another setting may result from an absence of opportunities for
efficient transactions in that setting.
In short, while the Kaldor-Hicks benefits from nondisclosure
practices will not always translate into mutual benefits, there is
not as dramatic a gap between these two efficiency concepts as
may at first appear Competition can convert Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency into mutual benefit, as can packaging transactions as long
term relationships. In contexts where nondisclosure appears likely
to generate efficiency gains, one might wish to have clear evidence
that the express terms or customary understandings of a particu-
lar trade called for full disclosure before declaring that the back-
ground rule permitting nondisclosure had been contractually
varied.23
B. Summarizing the Rules of Nondisclosure
The focus of this article, which has been on the benefits of
certain nondisclosure practices, should not be misinterpreted as a
theory that nondisclosure is generally unobjectionable. Rather, the
focus is a counterweight to a literature which is heavily oriented
toward condemning nondisclosure as tantamount to fraud. Be-
cause of this emphasis, however, the reasons that nondisclosure is
a highly suspect practice bear repeating.
Apart from its distributional effects, trading without disclos-
ure is a source of stark inefficiencies. If a homeowner is aware of
termite infestation or that a polluting factory will soon be operat-
234. Consider the ambiguity between description and prescription in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts. See supra note 232.
235. See R. SUGDEN, THE EcONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND WELFARE 25-
29 (1986) (arguing that existing rules of morality are based on efficient strategies).
236. The relationship between the underlying case for a particular background rule,
or "default" rule, and the clarity of evidence that must be present to vary that rule is
explored in Ayres & Gertner, supra note 177, at 123 (The courts should "establish
'safeharbors' of contractual language that will be sufficient to reach contractual
outcomes.").
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ing next door, there are substantial inefficiencies in allowing a
transaction to take place without disclosure. For one thing, trans-
action costs are incurred in negotiating the sale, moving in, and
moving out.23 7 More importantly, the buyer may make inappropri-
ate decisions in reliance on faulty or incomplete information,
whereas the seller could have made sensible, corrective decisions if
still in possession of the property 238 Finally, the fact of the sale
confers none of the customary confidence that the buyer values
the commodity, which is a house with termites or a house near a
factory, more highly than does the seller; the buyer may indeed
value it less.
It would be ideal to construct a general theory of nondisclo-
sure.239 Toward this future endeavor, this article has sought to ar-
ticulate the general structure of a nondisclosure theory that might
guide future understanding in this area. The general framework
for the nondisclosure problem should include appropriate open-en-
ded clauses to accommodate the probability of particular types of
future knowledge.
It is important that the factors relevant to the exchange-
promise dichotomy be separated from those relevant to the affirm-
ative, exchange-based efficiencies arising from nondisclosure. As
noted earlier, the same factors that aggravate the social costs of
an inefficient nondisclosure tend to increase the benefits from a
nondisclosure in a setting where efficiency gains from nondisclo-
sure are possible.240 The disclaimability problem should also re-
ceive a more explicit treatment than it has in the past. Toward
this end, the following tentative rules might be considered:
Rule 1. Duty to Disclose - In General
A. Unless nondisclosure is privileged under Rule 2, a party to a
contract is under an obligation to disclose facts pertinent to the
contractual exchange whenever the risk that nondisclosure will
frustrate the process of mutually beneficial exchange outweighs
the prospect that a disclosure duty would unduly jeopardize the
security of promissory transactions.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
238. See Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive
Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REv. 879, 907 (1986) (arguing
that sellers will have a "fair incentive" to obtain information about their property if buyers
routinely ask to inspect the property before buying).
239. For a discussion of the history of nondisclosure theories from Cicero to
Levmore, see Lawson, supra note 66, at 740-45.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 75-87.
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B. In making the assessment dictated by Section A, courts
should consider the following factors:
1. The materiality of the fact not disclosed;
2. The extent to which the undisclosed information is readily
accessible to the other contracting party;24'
3. The difference in the degree of intelligence and commercial
sophistication of the parties;
4. Any action taken by the nondisclosing party to prevent
discovery;
5. Whether the defect is intrinsic or extrinsic to the commodity
involved in the transaction;
6. Such other facts as the courts might find pertinent in weigh-
ing the competing policies outlined in Section A of this Rule.
Rule 2. Privilege of Nondisclosure
A. Notwithstanding Rule 1, and subject to Rule 3, a party to a
contract is under no obligation to disclose information to the ex-
tent that such nondisclosure is privileged by virtue of the social
utility that such nondisclosure generates in any of the ways iden-
tified in Section B of this Rule.
B. A party is under no obligation to disclose:
1. Information about the property being purchased that the
owner of such property might not have discovered within a rea-
sonable period of time;2 42
2. Information about the increase in value of the property being
purchased that is generated as an external benefit of purchaser
activity 243
3. Information about impending supply and demand conditions
for the commodity where the general market will receive correct
signalling from the changes in the prices generated by trades;
4. Information that could be used by the other transacting party
in an opportunistic or extortionate manner;
5. Information that must remain undisclosed to preserve other
efficiencies that the courts may identify.
Rule 3. Waiver of Privilege of Nondisclosure
A. The privilege of nondisclosure outlined in Rule 2 may be
241. Omitted from this list is the factor, which Keeton included, of whether it is the
buyer or the seller who fails to disclose. See supra text accompanying note 23. In certain
circumstances, status as buyer or seller may be relevant to the issue of access to informa-
tion. However, considering it separately tends to confuse the issues of privilege and
materiality.
242. This would include both intrinsic and extrinsic information. See supra text ac-
companying notes 104-07 (purchase of land for a railroad presenting a hybrid situation).
243. For this purpose, it would not matter whether the information reached the other
party immediately or after a lengthy interval. See supra text accompanying notes 90-96.
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waived in any of the following ways:
1. Express contractual language calling for full disclosure or
warranting that a party does not possess inside information;
2. Relationships of such trust and confidence that full disclosure
is reasonably expected, where there has been no express dis-
claimer of full disclosure;
3. A course of dealing, performance, or trade usage calling for
full disclosure, where there has been no express disclaimer of
full disclosure;
4. Affirmatively stating facts that are misleading by virtue of
undisclosed information or become misleading by circumstantial
changes.
5. Other methods which convince the court that the parties did
not intend to assert their privileges.
B. In ascertaining whether the parties have waived a privilege of
nondisclosure, the courts should independently examine the
strength of the efficiency claims made for the nondisclosure
under Rule 2. If evidence supporting an efficiency claim is
strong, a finding of waiver must be supported by correspondingly
strong evidence.
Rule 4. Gap-Filling, Including Consequential Damages
A. When ruling upon issues unaddressed in a contract, a court
may consider the effect of a particular gap-filling rule in encour-
aging the disclosure of relevant facts. This consideration may be
given weight under the following circumstances and will have
the following significance:
1. Where the disclosure is required under the factors identified
in Rule 1 and is excluded from the examples listed as privileged
within Rule 2, the court has reason to select the rule encourag-
ing disclosure; or
2. Where the disclosure is one in which nondisclosure would be
privileged under Rule 2, the court has reason not to select the
rule encouraging disclosure, unless the privilege has been waived
under Rule 3.
B. Unless the parties provide otherwise, damages for breach of
contract should not include special consequential damages that
could have been disclosed by the parties, unless such nondisclo-
sure is privileged under Rule 2 and the privilege has not been
expressly or impliedly waived under Rule 3.
VII. CONCLUSION
A general theory of nondisclosure has remained elusive for
both courts and commentators. The various positions have not
lacked rhetorical support from the judiciary; one court argued
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that "a person may with perfect honesty and propriety use to his
own advantage the superior knowledge of property he desires to
purchase, that has been acquired by skill, energy, vigilance and
other legitimate means ",244 A second tribunal condemned
"the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage
of such [inside] information knowing it is unavailable to those
with whom he is dealing."245 Seemingly expressing a moderate po-
sition between these two extremes, another court observed that
"law in its sanctions is not coextensive with morality It cannot
undertake to put all parties to every contract on an equality as to
knowledge, experience, skill and shrewdness."24
As this article has sought to demonstrate, the way out of this
rhetorical impasse is to draw certain basic distinctions. First, it is
essential to distinguish arguments which advocate a tolerance of
nondisclosure in order to protect the security of transactions from
those arguments approving or privileging nondisclosure in order to
advance independent public policies. Second, one must differenti-
ate between types of nondisclosure patterns. Nondisclosures that
merge resources and information are fundamentally different from
nondisclosures that sever the two. Equally basic differences exist
between nondisclosures where the trading itself can and cannot
serve as a pricing proxy for the information. Finally, nondisclo-
sures of information that would create incentives for opportunism
or would block the formation of enterprises that confer external
benefits represent distinct categories of cases.
No general theory that seeks to condemn, praise, or tolerate
the phenomenon of nondisclosure can be sufficiently sensitive to
these important distinctions, nor can a theory that lists "factors"
for courts to consider in a grand balance, since the factors that cut
in one direction when the issue is the security of transactions may
argue for the opposite result when the issue is privilege.2 47 Ironi-
cally, a general theory can only succeed when it is recognized that
there are discrete types of both nondisclosure transactions and ar-
guments, and that each type must be evaluated separately within
the broader theory
244. Hays v. Meyers, 139 Ky. 440, 442-43, 107 S.W 287, 288 (1908).
245. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
246. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 363, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (1933).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 82-87.
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